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Abstract
Despite the violence resulting from its internal armed conflict, Colombia’s indigenous 
movement is among the most organized in Latin America. NGOs based in North America 
play a number of roles within the movement, in an effort to bring the movement closer to 
achieving its goals. This thesis investigates four such NGOs - Inter Pares, Rights and 
Democracy, Colombia Support Network, and En Camino - and assesses the effectiveness of 
programs run by each NGO. Information was gathered through first-hand interviews with 
representatives from these NGOs, from the websites of the NGOs, and through a literature 
search. Based upon this assessment, three roles are prescribed for North American NGOs 
to play within Colombia’s indigenous movement: research and advocacy, lobbying, and 
building networks of solidarity. Overall this thesis urges NGOs to focus foremost on 
developing a networking role with social movements to form long-term, reciprocal 
relationships.
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Introduction
Nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) are often exalted as being the answer 
to modern problems of poverty and inequality due to their supposed separation from 
government, because many are non-profit and because they may be perceived as 
tireless do-gooders. While this thesis certainly does not intend to challenge the 
usefulness of NGOs working on specific campaigns, the main goal here is to find out 
what roles NGOs have and can play within social movements. The uncertainty about 
what roles NGOs play with social movements stems from the nature of these 
movements themselves. Often the aims of social movements are long-term and 
involve somewhat intangible goals such as building solidarity between different 
countries and among various social movements. This is certainly true of the 
indigenous movement in Colombia, which is the social movement of relevance to this 
thesis. Working under unbelievable repression and violence, the Colombian indigenous 
movement has accomplished extraordinary things, such as reclaiming traditional lands 
and defending them without the use of weapons or violence. However, the movement 
still has a long way to go toward both compelling the government to recognize the 
rights of indigenous peoples and creating a space within Colombia where indigenous 
communities will not be threatened with violence by Colombia’s many armed groups. 
While the goals of the movement include defending indigenous land rights and 
defeating free trade initiatives currently under discussion between Colombia and the 
U.S., one of the over-arching aims of the movement is to build and strengthen 
relationships between other indigenous and marginalized peoples around the world. 
Ultimately this thesis w ill answer the question: ‘What roles have North American NGOs 
played in Colombia’s indigenous movement and what roles should they play?’ After 
investigating the programs that have been initiated with the Colombian indigenous
movement by four North American NGOs, three roles will be prescribed for North 
American NGOs to play with the movement: research and advocacy, lobbying, and 
building networks of solidarity.
There are four main reasons for which this thesis question was undertaken. 
First, the relationship between NGOs and social movements is one that is under­
explored in both NGO and social movement literature. This thesis will be a 
contribution towards understanding this relationship. Second, because indigenous 
communities in Colombia face a variety of economic, physical, and legal threats, it is 
imperative to investigate ways in which these threats can be removed or minimized. 
Involving NGOs in the indigenous movement may be a means to accomplish this. 
Third, it cannot be assumed that NGO involvement in the movement is necessarily 
beneficial. This thesis seeks to determine which roles are the most worthwhile for 
NGOs to play with the movement, and will base this assessment on critiques of NGOs 
contained in NGO literature and on the previous experiences of the case study NGOs, 
outlined in Chapter Four. Finally, an underlying theme examined in this thesis is the 
potential for a social movement to transcend the borders of a nation-state. A 
foundation for such a transnational movement based on common identity and 
marginalization exists already; this could unite the world’s indigenous peoples through 
the hardships that they suffer in countries around the world. The case study of the 
indigenous movement in Colombia was chosen because it represents one of the 
strongest, most organised contemporary indigenous movements, despite the 
atmosphere of brutality within which it exists.
The impetus for this thesis came from my interest in the tactics used by the 
movement to organize in the midst of Colombia’s conflict, which involves a variety of 
armed actors and makes Colombia the most violent country in the hemisphere. I
chose to study the indigenous movement (as opposed to other active social movements 
such as the labour movement or the v/omen's movement) because I was interested to 
discover how indigenous communities in Colombia deal with violence on their lands as 
well as mobilize to achieve what other indigenous movements in the world are striving 
for: autonomy and secure land rights.
The Colombian indigenous movement is engaged in a variety of non-violent 
activities in defence of their communities, making it one of the best organized and 
most active indigenous movements in Latin America. 1 assumed that there would be 
many opportunities for NGOs to become involved in the movement and that there 
would be many roles for them to fill, owing to the situation faced by indigenous 
peoples in Colombia. Assumptions were not enough and so 1 set out to investigate the 
interface between NGOs and the indigenous social movement in Colombia.
There are several reasons why 1 find the Colombian situation so fascinating. My 
hometown of London, Ontario is home to one of the largest Colombian refugee 
populations in North America, so throughout high school and university 1 was exposed 
to the situation in Colombia via Colombian friends and acquaintances. Gabriel Garcia 
Marquez, a Nobel Prize-winning Colombian writer, as had an enormous influence on 
my desire to study Colombia since 1 read One Hundred Years of Solitude at the age of 
21. Finally, my interest in pursuing this topic came about because of my involvement 
with an organization known as Enlaces Canada-Colombia, which is a group that aims to 
build solidarity between youth movements in Canada and Colombia. Since Enlaces is 
only three years old, I hoped that by undertaking a case study of the relationships 
between four North American NGOs and the indigenous movement in Colombia, 1 could 
help Enlaces better develop its own programs by learning from the successes and 
failures of the four case study NGOs.
Chapter One will explain that NGOs are those organisations situated 
conceptually in the space that exists in between the state and the market known as 
‘civil society'. While the body of literature surrounding the difficulties of defining the 
NGO as a concept is large (elaborated upon in Chapter One), for the purposes of this 
thesis, the term ‘NGO’ will be used to refer to organisations which are not-for-profit, 
autonomous, non-market-oriented, nongovernmental organisations whose purpose is to 
benefit the poor and underprivileged members of a population. Part Two of Chapter 
One explores the various roles played by different NGOs, including advocacy, lobbying, 
welfare, capacity-building, and networking. Part Three looks at the literature 
surrounding criticisms of and obstacles to NGO effectiveness.
In Chapter Two, the term ‘social movement’ is explored and ultimately defined 
as a self-organised and self-aware mobilization of a group of people that is actively 
confronting specific power structures and that is concerned with bringing about 
political and social change. Chapter Two also includes a brief history of social 
movements and summarizes theories about how they grow. Information that supplied 
Chapters One and Two was obtained through a review of recent and relevant 
literature, contained in monographs and scholarly journals.
Chapter Three moves away from theory to describe the situation in Colombia 
and the actors who are at the forefront of the conflict, including guerrilla factions, 
the paramilitaries, and the Colombian Armed Forces. A description of the U.S. funded 
Plan Colombia follows, explaining the rationale behind its inception and the 
destination of its funds. The second portion of Chapter Three is dedicated to the 
indigenous movement in Colombia, concentrating on those that represent indigenous 
communities within the department (Colombia’s equivalent of provinces or states) of 
Cauca as well as the national indigenous organisation. The context within which these
groups organize is one of intense violence. Guerrilla groups, the paramilitary 
organisations, and the Colombian Armed Forces are at the forefront of this conflict 
which is fueled by the illic it drug trade and characterized by competing political 
beliefs. Neutrality is not recognized within this conflict; those who refuse to take 
sides are constantly under threat and are often assassinated or disappeared. Around 
20,000 people are murdered in Colombia each year, often as a consequence of 
organizing within unions, feminist groups, peace communities, or other organisations 
that condemn violence in Colombia and work to create a space therein where human 
rights are respected.
This thesis will focus on three organisations within the indigenous movement; 
the Organizacion Nacional Indigena de Colombia (ONIC) (National Indigenous 
Organisation of Colombia), the Asociacion de Cabildos Indigenas del Norte del Cauca 
(ACIN) (Association of Cabildos of Northern Cauca), and the Consejo Regional Indigena 
del Cauca (CRIC) (Regional Indigenous Council of Colombia). The latter two groups 
were chosen for study because they are regarded as the most politically active 
indigenous organisations in Colombia; ONIC was chosen as it encompasses all of the 
regional indigenous organisations in the country. Recognizing that two of these 
organisations are based in the department of Cauca, Chapter Three w ill explain why 
this small department has become a model for indigenous organizing. Because of the 
extent to which these three groups mobilize, ONIC, ACIN, and CRIC will be used as 
representatives of the broader indigenous movement in Colombia and w ill be referred 
to in this thesis as the ‘Colombian indigenous movement’ . By also describing the 
histories and mandates of ONIC, ACIN, and CRIC, the latter half of this chapter will 
synthesize information from Chapter Two to explain why the indigenous movement in 
Colombia constitutes a social movement. Facts, statistics, and descriptions of the
situation in Colombia and of the three indigenous organisations were obtained from a 
number of sources, including monographs, journals, the U.S. Department of State 
website. Human Rights Watch, and the websites of ONIC, ACIN, and CRIC. This last 
section of Chapter Three will also include a brief history and describe current 
activities of two prominent indigenous movements in Latin America: those of Bolivia 
and Ecuador. This section was included as to contextualize the Colombian indigenous 
movement, in an effort to show the similar factors that compel indigenous 
communities around Latin America to mobilize.
The final chapter investigates the roles played by four North American NGOs: 
Rights and Democracy, En Camino, Inter Pares, and Colombia Support Network,in 
relation to the Colombian indigenous movement. Upon starting this project I assumed 
there would be many North American NGOs working with the Colombian indigenous 
movement, I discovered that this was not the case. While there quite possibly are 
smaller grassroots groups working with the movement, these four case study NGOs had 
a website (which I used to contact them) and each had a representative who was 
willing to be interviewed for this thesis. Although I contacted three other NGOs - 
Amazon Alliance, Peace Brigades International, and Development and Peace - no 
representatives from any of these organizations agreed to participate in my research. 
However, the four NGOs chosen present an interesting and relevant case study. Inter 
Pares and Rights and Democracy are well-established NGOs and are among the most 
active Canadian development NGOs. These two NGOs are contrasted by En Camino 
and Colombia Support Network which are more grassroots based and less well-known 
to the general public. Upon starting this project I hoped that by examining NGOs with 
such different approaches to working with the movement this thesis would make more
meaningful statements about what roles North American NGOs should be playing with 
Colombia’s indigenous movement.
This thesis looks exclusively at North American NGOs (as opposed to Colombian 
or European NGOs) for several reasons. First, in order to avoid the language barrier 
that would be faced by studying Colombian NGOs. Second, because the U.S. has a 
significant role in Colombia's conflict via Plan Colombia (explained in Chapter Three) 
and because Canada enjoys a close relationship with the U.S., I assumed North 
American NGOs would be very involved with social movements in Colombia which are 
working to combat the ill effects of Plan Colombia. Since the U.S. has such a strong 
influence in Latin America, I expected North American NGOs to be working fervently 
to induce the U.S. to change its harmful policies which directly and indirectly affect 
Colombian indigenous communities. (One of these policies is the Plan Colombia which 
will be addressed in Chapter Three.) Thirdly, the Colombian conflict has caused 
massive internal and external displacement. Since a huge number of these refugees 
have fled to Canada and the U.S. (3,631 asylum applications were received in Canada, 
2,759 in the U.S. in 2004), I assumed that this very visible consequence of Colombia's 
conflict would motivate individuals and organizations within North America to become 
involved in Colombia (UNHCR 2004:14).
Specifically, these four North American NGOs were chosen because each NGO 
stated clearly on its website that it  works with either ONIC, ACIN, or CRIC, because a 
representative from each NGO readily agreed to be interviewed about his/her NGO, 
and because together these NGOs act in a variety of roles, allowing for a more 
interesting and relevant study. As will become clear in Chapter Four, clear 
differences exist between these four case study NGOs. Despite these differences, all 
four NGOs still fit within the confines of my NGO definition, outlined in Chapter One.
Whether or not the NGO definition is appropriate or useful w ill be examined in the 
Conclusion chapter.
Information on these four NGOs was obtained through phone interviews and 
mail correspondences; six were conducted with representatives from each of the four 
case study NGOs and with one expert who has worked in Colombia with the indigenous 
movement. All interviews were conducted between November 2004 and February 
2005, tape recorded (in the case of telephone interviews), and transcribed by the 
author. The transcripts were then emailed to each participant in order to verify the 
accuracy of the transcription. I received written permission from all interviewees that 
the information communicated to me in the course of the interview could be used in 
the thesis. Upon completion of the thesis research each recorded interview was 
erased and each email interview deleted. Approval to conduct these interviews was 
granted to me by the ethics board at UNBC in April 2004. Although I had intended the 
interviews to be semi-structured in format, in practice they were closer to being 
unstructured. Interview questions may be found in the Appendix. The goal of this 
thesis was to focus on the roles that North American NGOs have and should be playing 
with the Colombian indigenous movement. I therefore chose to focus on the programs 
run by these NGOs and look at them from each NGOs' perspective. For this reason I 
decided to base my research around interviews with NGO representatives instead of 
with Colombian indigenous community members.
This thesis advocates around the need for NGOs to expand their vision of what 
development means. In the case of social movements, NGOs must adopt long-term 
working relationships that involve other NGOs and social movements working in 
solidarity to change the root causes of social movement grievances. The underlying 
theme in this thesis emphasizes the strengthening of linkages between NGOs and
social movements to build a strong civil society that can effectively challenge issues of 
inequality, injustice, and violence.
CHAPTER ONE 
Understanding NGOs
In the last few decades, entities known as non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) have been increasingly studied and at present are considered to be of 
relevance to a variety of disciplines, including political science, international studies, 
anthropology, and economics (Parker, 2003). Not only are more and more studies 
being conducted on and around NGOs but these organisations have proliferated over 
the past few decades (Malholtra 2000, Lindenberg 6t Bryant 2001, Karns & Mingst 2004, 
Doh 2003). According to Fernando and Heston (1997:9), “NGOs have arisen as a 
response to attempts by social groups to secure social, economic, and political 
equality; a sustainable environment; and peaceful ethnic, religious, or national 
relations and as a resistance against all forms of exploitation and domination.” NGOs 
have come to fill the space between state and m arket-civil society-and have 
developed as a whole to be very versatile indeed. As suggested above, NGOs can be 
secular or religious, dedicated to one ethnic group or multicultural, committed to the 
protection of the environment or to indigenous peoples, have a mandate to reduce 
poverty, or be any combination of these.
The roles filled by NGOs are incredibly varied, making it difficult to define 
NGOs clearly and concisely. This chapter attempts to briefly review pertinent 
literature about the nature of NGOs and their roles in order to identify the types of 
discourse and debate that surround them. The first section will attem pt to define the 
term NGO based on the work of theorists such as Vakil (1997), Korten (1990), and 
Willetts (1982). Section two will draw upon these definitions in order to categorize 
some of the roles of NGOs. Third, the chapter will review a number of academic
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criticisms of NGO roles. The ultimate goal of Chapter One is to situate the present 
case study of North American NGOs within the established NGO literature.
The Search for a Definition
The task of defining the term ‘NGO’ is not a simple one, a fact acknowledged 
widely in the academic literature(Rosenau 2002, Vakil 1997, Jordan & van Tuijl 2000). 
In order to lessen the confusion surrounding the term, this section will draw from the 
work of a number of theorists, each of whom contribute to various facets of an NGO 
definition. For example, Hilhorst (2003) provides a definition of ‘NGO’ based on the 
overall purpose of an organisation while Landim (1987) categorizes NGOs based on the 
nature of the groups to which they are committed. Korten (1990) and Vakil (1997) 
both feature prominently in this section as both theorists have devoted much thought 
to the question of how to define an NGO.
The difficulty of defining the term ‘NGO’ stems from the fact that it is very 
broad and encompasses most organisations that are not an arm of government. 
Confusingly, some groups strongly affiliated with government are still considered to be 
a form of NGO. These organisations have come to be known as ‘governmental 
nongovernmental organisations’ (GONGOs), which are “creations of government and 
serve as instruments of government policy’’ but closely resemble NGOs in purpose and 
in structure (Korten 1990: 2). The vagueness of the definition of ‘NGO’ means that 
“hospitals, schools, charities, clubs, religious fraternities, development agencies, 
professor associations, cooperatives, mutual aid agencies, and trade associations’’ can 
all be included (Fernando and Heston 1997:10). NGOs therefore range “from loosely 
organised groups with a few unpaid staff members to organisations with multi-billion 
dollar budgets employing hundreds’’ (Fisher 1997:447). Members can be individuals or
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associations (Karns & Mingst 2004: 10). A unifying factor is that they are values-driven 
organisations that do not seek profit and are voluntary (Kaldor 2003:86). Vakil points 
out that the multidisciplinary nature of NGOs creates further ambiguity in the 
definition as “the literature on NGOs [...] spans nearly all of the pure and applied 
social sciences” (Vakil 1997:2060). Recognizing that so many different types of 
organisations fall under the NGO umbrella, Ginsburg (1998:online) divides NGOs into 
three categories. First, NGOs can exist as grassroots movements, which are often 
closely linked to social movements with the broad goal of reforming social norms; 
second, they can be non-profit businesses; third, locally-based institutions or 
international entities, operating with either very little  funding or large budgets fueled 
by government/private sector grants and contracts. According to Willetts (1982:3), 
pressure groups (including communal groups and promotional groups) also fall under 
the heading ‘NGO’ .
Pressure groups are so called because they seek to influence political decision 
makers. Under this sub-heading fall communal groups and promotional groups. While 
promotional group category includes welfare agencies, communal groups are "distinct 
segments of society" that promote group identity and group status (Willetts 1982:3,5). 
Some have specific interests but others are concerned more with wider political 
questions. Few have formal links with international NGOs (INGGs) but many have 
"strong informal bilateral transnational communications with their ethnic kin" or "with 
governments which are hostile to the government in their own country” (Willets 
1982:3).
Vakil (1997:2058) points out that a major problem with finding a good 
definition for ‘NGO’ is that there is no consistency in the use of the term. For 
instance, the terms ‘NGO’ , ‘private voluntary organisation’ , and ‘non-profit
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organisation’ , are often used interchangeably even though their intended meanings 
can be quite varied.
Thus it is clearly demonstrable that ‘NGO’ is a multi-dimensional term that 
conveys little  specific meaning if  not more explicitly defined. It is apparent that a 
number of diverse groups and organisations can fit within the term 'NGO'. Although 
Fisher (1997:449) contends that it  is unproductive to spend much time studying the 
distinctions between different types of NGOs and that it is more important to 
understand “what happens in specific places and at specific times’’, it  remains vital to 
clearly understand the nature of the object under study. It is therefore important to 
narrow down to a specific definition. This section will present several different 
appropriate definitions and choose one to be used as a reference for the case study 
NGOs.
This thesis is concerned with those NGOs that may be termed ‘development’ 
NGOs. For the purposes of this particular study, therefore, the term ‘NGO’ and 
‘development NGO’ are interchangeable. Although, traditionally, development NGOs 
were considered to be those NGOs carrying out development projects in a specific 
community or region, most development NGOs today work in several different arenas, 
including the environment, human rights, women, advocacy, and development (Nelson 
Et Dorsey 2003:2018). Therefore the term ‘development NGO’ is meant to include 
NGOs working in any of these areas. Hilhorst presents a very general definition of a 
development NGO in her book entitled The Real World o f NGOs. She writes: “I define 
the term of NGO as a label claiming that the organisation does good for the 
development of poor and marginalized others (2003:215)’’. While this is of course a 
vague description of what a development NGO is, Hilhorst’s definition does 
nonetheless exclude a number of organisations and groups. Because all of the NGOs
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used in my case study meet the qualifications of Hilhorst’s development NGO, her 
definition can be used as a departure point for the broader study of NGOs working 
with social movements.
However, a more specific definition is still needed in order to fully encompass 
which NGOs are being examined here. Landim presents a useful definition that is 
particularly relevant to this project: “[NGOs] are entities that think of themselves 
largely in terms of autonomy and individuality, stressing their direct relationships with 
social groups and movements within which they act: NGOs are not an end unto
themselves, existing rather ‘at the service’ of the exploited and underprivileged 
sectors of the population” (1987:30) NGOs therefore do not merely ‘aim to help’ 
subaltern groups, their very existence indeed depends upon such groups. Yet still a 
more explicit definition is needed.
In his 1990 work Getting to the Century, David Korten distinguishes 
between four main types of NGOs: voluntary organisations, public service contractors, 
people’s organisations, and governmental nongovernmental organisations. While all 
are considered legitimate NGOs, Korten’s definition of a voluntary organisation (VO) is 
the most pertinent to this project. VOs “pursue a social mission driven by a 
commitment to shared values” (Korten 1990:2), which are relied upon “as the basis for 
mobilizing human and financial resources. Citizens contribute their time, money and 
other resources to a VO because they believe in what it  is contributing to society” 
(Korten 1990:98). VOs differ from Korten’s other three classes of NGO because they 
do not act as market-oriented non-profit businesses like public service contractors, do 
not exist solely to serve the needs of its members as do people’s organisations, nor are 
they created by governments to serve as instruments of official policy as are 
governmental nongovernmental organisations (Korten 1990:2).
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Anna Vakil takes the argument a step further than Korten and devotes a 
lengthy article entirely to the subject of NGO classification and definition, narrowing 
down the definition of NGO to include only organisations that are “self-governing, 
private, not-for-profit organisations that are geared to improving the quality of life of 
disadvantaged people” (1997:2060). Notably, this definition differentiates between 
‘not-for-profit’ and ‘non-profit’ groups; the term ‘not-for-profit’ is used to specify 
that the goal for NGOs is not to earn a profit but that organisations who do turn a 
profit should not necessarily be excluded from the NGO category. Specifically, this 
term is used so as to include cooperatives, which, although unintentionally, sometimes 
earn and distribute profits (Vakil, 1997:2059).
To draw from the previous four definitions and synthesize a meaningful 
categorization appropriate for this thesis, NGOs will hereafter be understood to be 
not-for-profit, autonomous, non-market-oriented organisations that exist in order to 
benefit the poor and underprivileged members of a population. These dimensions 
were chosen as they form a concise and inclusive description of the four NGOs that 
will be studied later in this thesis. All NGOs to be studied are based in either Canada 
or the U.S. thus here the term ‘NGO’ will reflect as such.
Roles Filled by NGOs
NGOs have proliferated exponentially in recent decades. One w riter has 
calculated that there are 50,000 non-profit NGOs at the global level, and that almost 
90% of these were formed since 1970 (Keane 2003:5). What is it  about NGOs that has 
caused them to multiply both nationally and internationally? Several writers (Frantz 
1987, Whaites 2000, Teegen & Doh 2003, Hudock 1999) have observed that NGOs 
operate within a space in society left vacant by both the state and the market.
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Businesses function within the market to distribute goods and services to the 
population, however, since there is no natural mechanism within the market to ensure 
that these goods and services be produced ethically and environmentally soundly, it  is 
the state’s job to create and enforce laws that oblige businesses to conform to 
national standards. With government and business fulfilling their respective roles, 
NGOs have found a niche-a space between these two sectors of society-in which lie 
important roles to be filled. This space is generally known as ‘civil society’ and 
encompasses everything in society that is neither government nor business. While 
NGOs are often equated with civil society, it is important to recognize that they are 
really just one set of actors which operate within civil society (Karns & Mingst 
2004:223).
Distinguishing himself from writers who see the state, the market, and civil 
society as separate, individually acting entities, Robert Cox suggests that such a 
fragmented view of the global order is rooted in traditional international relations 
theory and does not reflect today’s reality that the state and civil society are 
“interpenetrated” and “only very vaguely and imprecisely indicative of distinct 
spheres of activity” (Cox 1996:86). I am inclined to combine these two views and 
concur with Fowler’s (2000) analysis: that NGOs, while they are indeed actors bonded 
to civil society, cannot be analyzed on this basis alone. The state, the market, and 
civil society interact with each other in a regular way. In this case, NGOs interact 
with the state to induce policy reform and to act as a watchdog, and with the market 
to influence corporate behaviour and ensure that businesses comply with their own 
codes of conduct. Within civil society, NGOs gain legitimacy, accountability, and 
resources that they use as leverage in their interactions with the state and the market 
(Fowler 2000).
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Despite these interactions, NGOs still have unique roles to fill outside of the
state and the market. The roles NGOs fill are numerous: they do what businesses
deem unprofitable and what government lacks the expertise or ability to do (Ng fit
Lindenberg 2002, Teegen and Doh 2003, Johnson 2002, Karns & Mingst 2004). Whaites
(2000:134) writes that filling the gap between government and business can entail
anything from running schools and hospitals (in the case where civil society is strong
and the state is weak) to aiding agricultural workers or providing training in the health
sector, lion (1998:online) concurs that NGOs exist in the space between government
and business and explains why society needs these types of organisations:
Generally, market-based entities do not fulfill people’s needs to pursue 
opportunities or validate their cultures and unique histories. Both 
market-based and non-market-based sectors of global society require 
that these needs be addressed. These desires require a non-market 
based system of organisations. Many NGOs can and do speak to these 
needs (lion 1998:online).
Korten (1990) points out that because NGOs often specialize in one area or 
reflect a particular interest, it is often easier for citizens in a democracy to express 
their interests via a particular NGO than through representative government. NGOs 
can articulate the momentary interests and needs of a country’s population and 
communicate this to government. While Hudock (1999) agrees that alerting 
government to the changing demands of the public is one function performed by 
NGOs, she adds that NGOs are better than governments at working cost-effectively, 
learning from and applying field research to develop solutions to problems, responding 
to people’s needs flexibly, and undertaking people-centred research. Recognizing 
that NGOs possess definite advantages over the state, Tembo writes that NGOs are 
“more flexible, better attuned to learning from experience and experimentation, 
innovative, participatory, low cost and efficient, and responsive to the needs of the
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poor” (2003:2). NGOs possess qualities that set them apart from business as well.
Johnson writes that NGOs are generally perceived as being more altruistic than the
market and more flexible since they put less emphasis on rigid codes of behaviour.
They also “provide goods and services that are not subject to the ‘ logic’ of price
incentives and competition” (Johnson 2002:89). Frantz describes why social groups
within a country seek out or form NGOs:
It is clear that NGOs can translate local needs and peculiarities into the 
formulation of their objectives and methods of action. This is because, 
when they are national, NGOs tend to have a closer relationship to the 
social movements, groups, or projects that they support. They are 
capable of quicker and more objective action than governmental 
agencies because their administrative structures are less cumbersome 
and because their character is more militant. (Frantz 1987:126).
The remainder of this section will explore some of the different roles played by NGOs
within the space between the state and the market. Although NGOs of course play a
diversity of roles, those functions discussed below were chosen because they are most
relevant to this thesis and relate best to the four case study NGOs presented in
Chapter Four. It is important to note that none of these roles are mutually exclusive.
Most NGOs in fact operate in several different roles.
Research and Advocacy
Advocacy is one role played by NGOs which falls in the aforementioned space 
between government and business. According to Vakil, advocacy is “the intention of 
influencing policy- or decision-making related to particular issues and building social 
support both among like-minded organisations as well as the wider population around 
these issues” (1997:2063). Similarly, Lindenberg & Bryant write, “advocacy work 
entails moving beyond implementing programs to help those in need, to actually 
taking up and defending the causes of others and speaking out to the public on
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another’s behalf” (2001:173). Jordan & van Tuijl (2000:2052) criticize definitions of 
advocacy that feature policy influence as a major characteristic since these definitions 
ignore other functions of advocacy such as enhancing the self-respect of weaker 
communities, promoting mutual trust, and moderating unequal power relations. In 
the case of this thesis, advocacy is generally understood to mean promotion of specific 
policies and steps to benefit indigenous communities and other marginalized groups in 
Colombia. This concept of an advocacy role responds to Jordan & van TuiJTs above 
criticism, since several of the case study NGOs in Chapter Four strive to build 
reciprocal relationships of solidarity and trust with indigenous communities in 
Colombia and exchange information on that basis.
NGOs that focus on advocacy also tend to play a prominent research role as 
well, promoting policies and opening up new development discourses which result 
from this research. As Welch explains in the context of human rights NGOs, “research 
by itself accomplishes little  in terms of direct impact on victims and changes in 
conditions. Study precedes action, but does not substitute for it. [...] Research must 
be linked to improved conditions, to campaigns of advocacy, and to support from 
appropriate resources” (2001:10). It is for this reason that advocacy and research go 
hand-in-hand.
NGO focus on advocacy is becoming increasingly common, as is evident in Latin 
America. This shift has been observed by Grugel (2003), who notes that such a trend 
is occurring among NGOs that were previously focused on project-based, small-scale 
development work, that began to realize that such project-based initiatives actually 
help relatively few people and any benefits to communities often only last as long as 
the project itself. In other words, project-based work is a limited and superficial 
solution to a problem that is systemic in nature. Because advocacy focuses on the
19
root causes of poverty instead of merely trying to bandage the wounds that are a 
result of a flawed world system, it is an approach that is beginning to appeal to many 
more NGOs. NGOs working in Latin America that have chosen an advocacy path, 
writes Grugel (2003:46), either promote a total overhaul of the world system or 
challenge the global economy “to undercut the legitimacy of Latin American 
governments that do not take the needs of the poor into account or listen to poor
communities in terms of policy making”.
In the case of NGOs based in North America but that work in Latin America, the 
advocacy role is crucial. Brodhead (1987:2) writes that NGOs in industrialized 
countries have a responsibility to advocate on behalf of Third World countries, both to 
change public opinion in industrialized countries and to give rise to change in official 
government policies which affect Third World countries. It is vital, continues 
Brodhead, that northern NGOs engage in advocacy: “Given the preponderant control
exercised by industrialized countries in the multilateral system and in the
management of the global economy, it is incumbent upon NGOs to take on a 
constructive advocacy role” (Brodhead 1987:4). Korten (1990:99) agrees, writing that 
voluntary organisations have “a distinctive role as catalysts of system change in 
defining, articulating, and advocating positions that are not in the established political 
mainstream and therefore not supported by existing public policy”. Beyond 
advocating for such broad and revolutionary changes as the overhaul of the current 
global economic system, NGOs advocate for changes in the way development itself 
happens. Recognizing that NGOs act as links between governments, donors, 
communities, and even other NGOs, Keese (2003:8) observes that NGOs are in a good 
position from which to actively create a better global context for development. To 
this end, NGOs will often form advocacy networks, consisting of “those relevant actors
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[...] who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense 
exchanges of information and services” (Keck & Sikkink 1998:2). Advocacy networks 
are beneficial for both small and large NGOs; smaller NGOs are supported financially 
and institutionally by the larger, better established NGOs, while the smaller NGOs who 
work at the grassroots are better equipped to provide information about the situation 
on the ground to the larger NGOs (Karns St Mingst 2004:218).
Lobbying
While similar to advocacy, lobbying deserves its own category. Lobbying is a 
more direct form of advocacy in that it exerts direct pressure on governments, 
international bodies, and media to promote a specific viewpoint (Willetts 1982, Welch 
2001, Molyneux and Lazar 2003). Welch writes that lobbying is the act of working with 
government with the aim of eventually changing state policy or drafting treaties. To 
get to this stage, NGOs typically must build support for a cause through coalition- 
building with other NGOs and with states sympathetic to the cause. “The information 
NGOs so sedulously gather, verify, and disseminate is their major weapon in lobbying 
governments to change policies” (Welch 2001:6). In order to be effective, however, 
Edwards and Hulme believe that lobbying must “grow out of grassroots experience” 
and that this experience be linked “with lobbying and advocacy at the national and 
international level” (2000:53-4).
As a concrete example of what lobbying can achieve, Molyneux and Lazar 
(2003:3) write that human rights NGOs have done a terrific job of narrowing the gap 
between such ‘international instruments’ as the Declaration of Human Rights and 
“local populations’ awareness of their import”. Of course, modern communications 
media and improved literacy levels can be attributed to this trend, but Molyneux and
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Lazar believe that “civil society organisations and NGOs must also take much of the 
credit. They have lobbied governments to respect their commitments, they have 
worked closely with social movements to advance programmes of reform, and they 
have taken rights discourses into communities and into homes where they are 
debated, discussed, and acted upon” (2003:3).
Welfare
A traditional role played by NGOs is welfare, which includes needs-based 
development, emergency relief, and service delivery. Mohan (2002:16) writes that 
NGOs which play a welfare role are those through which “charity, bilateral and 
multilateral aid is channeled [...] in order to support welfare programmes and micro­
scale development”. Welfare NGOs, write Vakil (1997) and Willetts (1982) provide for 
basic needs of poor populations, after or during wars or environmental catastrophes. 
Korten fits welfare NGOs as ‘Generation One’ NGOs within his voluntary development 
action model. According to Korten (1990), Generation One NGOs are those that are 
involved with relieving immediate deficiencies in supplies of food, health care, or 
shelter. In this category the beneficiary is passive and it is assumed that all people 
need is limited short-term assistance to get them back on their feet. This role is 
easily distinguished from research and advocacy in that the NGO is directly involved 
with meeting the needs of the poor, the persecuted, or the hungry at a particular 
moment (Korten 1990:115-118).
Grugel differentiates between advocacy/research-based NGOs and welfare 
NGOs by asserting that organisations that fit in the latter category feel that they 
cannot wait for change in the global system to occur and must act immediately to help 
relieve suffering of the poor and disadvantaged (2003:46).
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Capacity-Building
While a welfare role concentrates on relieving immediate hardship, NGOs that 
operate in a capacity-building role go a step beyond welfare NGOs in that they try to 
ensure that target communities will not face hardship again in the future. Hudock 
defines capacity-building as “an explicit outside intervention to improve an 
organisation’s performance in relation to its mission, context, resources, and 
sustainability, achieved through a process-oriented approach of assisting the 
organisation to acknowledge, assess, and address its external environment” 
(1999:126). While this definition refers to building the capacity of local organisations, 
capacity-building can also take place within villages, grassroots movements and 
governments. For Meyer, capacity-building “typically includes increasing 
participation, transparency, and accountability. Improving technical and managerial 
abilities is also part of the package, as is promoting self-sufficiency” (1999:126). In 
addition to working with local grassroots groups, Whaites writes that NGOs should 
strive to improve the capacity of the state, unless the NGO is working in the context 
of a “particularly regressive regime.” This can be accomplished by providing training 
and assistance to government ministries and project managers (Whaites 2000:134-5). 
Molyneux and Lazar agree, noting that NGO-government collaboration has been on the 
rise in Latin America in recent years: “For the NGOs themselves, the chief means of 
engaging with the state were through raising cases with the relevant authorities, 
conducting campaigns among civil servants, collaborating on a local level for local 
development purposes and capacity-building workshops for state employees” 
(2003:57).
NGOs operating with a capacity-building role in mind fall under Korten's
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Generation Two category within his voluntary development action model. Generation 
Two NGOs focus “on developing the capacities of the people to better meet their own 
needs through self-reliant local action” (Korten 1990:118). These NGOs tend to focus 
on groups such as a village or some sub-group therein in order to build partnerships. 
Differing from the welfare role, capacity-building NGOs, or Generation Two NGOs, act 
typically as the mobilizer rather than as the on-the-ground implementer in order to 
“[help] the community realize its potential” (Korten 1990:119). Korten also offers a 
Generation Three NGO category that is somewhat related to Generation Two NGOs. 
Generation Three NGOs assume “that local inertia is sustained by structures that 
centralize control of resources, keep essential services from reaching the poor, and 
maintain systems of corruption and exploitation” (Korten 1990:121). Both Generation 
Two and Generation Three NGOs work to build the capacity of local people, but differ 
from each other in that Generation Two NGOs see underdevelopment as the result of a 
community’s inability to realize its potential on its own, while Generation Three NGOs 
believe the structures of global or national systems are at the root of 
underdevelopment (Korten 1990). If Generation Two NGOs act as ‘mobilizer’ for 
communities. Generation Three NGOs operate as catalysts for systemic change that 
aims to overturn the conditions that cause underdevelopment. While both Generation 
Two and Generation Three NGOs can be classified as ‘capacity-building NGOs’, the 
differences between the two are significant. Generation Three NGOs strive to build 
partnerships that could last decades, tend to focus on regions or nations rather than 
individual communities, and try to include all relevant public and private institutions 
within their projects (Korten 1990). Korten’s voluntary development action model will 
be used in Chapter Four in order to classify the four case study NGOs.
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Networking and Strengthening Civil Society
The final role filled by NGOs that will be explored in this first section is 
networking. Networking necessarily leads to the strengthening of other groups within 
civil society, including other NGOs, grassroots groups, and social movements. Korten 
defines networking as “the organisational mode of lateral communication, self- 
direction, rapid adaptation and social movements. It frees the flow of creative and 
voluntary energies and unlocks the barriers to change imposed by hierarchy” 
(1990:106). Often a network will arise when several advocacy NGOs converge around 
a single issue area. Willetts writes that co-operation among such groups occurs 
through informal division of tasks for greater efficiency and increased 
accomplishments, through coordinating activities and exchanging information. “The 
result can be not only a great deal of communication and co-operation but also a 
complex network of country wide and transnational organisations” (Willetts 1982:10). 
Furthermore, such networking can allow a smaller NGO to deal with diverse challenges 
without necessarily enlarging its formal structure (Meyer 1999:27) and has led to what 
Keane (2003) calls ‘global civil society' and what Keck and Sikkink (1998) call 
‘transnational advocacy networks'. While these terms will be discussed briefly later in 
this chapter, it should be mentioned here that ‘global civil society' and ‘transnational 
advocacy networks' involve broad networks and coalitions of NGOs and social 
movements, the strengthening of which also falls within the purview of NGOs.
NGOs that play this role are coined by Korten as ‘Fourth Generation NGOs', 
which he explains are NGOs “that engage in movement facilitation as a major program 
strategy” (Korten 1990:131). Fourth Generation NGOs aim to “energize a critical mass 
of independent, decentralized initiatives in support of a social vision” (Korten 1990: 
127). Within the social movement realm, Frantz differentiates between two types of
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NGOs: those supporting social movements with the goal of building a collective, all- 
inclusive society and those that have arisen from social movements and represent “a 
certain degree of their institutionalization” (1987:123). This thesis w ill concern the 
former type of NGO and ask what roles have North American NGOs played in 
Colombia’s indigenous movement and what roles should they play?
The following section is intended to balance this chapter by demonstrating that 
many doubts exist as to the effectiveness of NGOs. Such doubts tend to centre on 
sources of funding received by NGOs, but also concern the capacity of NGOs to address 
the root causes of the problems they seek to address. In light of these criticisms, the 
following section concludes by presenting ways for NGOs to become more effective.
NGO Critiques and Obstacles to NGO Effectiveness
Among the many different categories and functions of NGOs, academics also 
portray NGOs as either useful or as a hindrance to the communities they are trying to 
help. Some observers (lion 1998, Johnson 2002, Commins 2000, Edwards 1998) have 
remarked that NGOs simply cannot and do not perform as well they are perceived, 
lion explains that this may be because it is difficult for NGOs to maneuver around the 
traps inherent in the global economic system. Specifically, two major problems for 
NGOs exist: first, “community-based funding is frequently weak and unreliable 
relative to funding driven by profits” and second, it is difficult for NGOs not to 
conform to the values and goals of donor organisations (lion 1998). The overarching 
danger is that an NGO’s goals may be subordinated, however minorly or majorly, by 
the NGO’s need to secure funding. Often this “merging” of an NGO’s interests with 
those of its funders happens insidiously (lion 1998). Mohan agrees with lion, and 
points out the frustrating contradiction faced by NGOs: that it is difficult for NGOs to
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carry out projects with little  funding, but if  an NGO gets too much funding from one 
source, that NGO becomes too concerned with fulfilling demands of donors and risks 
becoming no longer able to deliver effective programs at the grassroots (2002:17). 
The underlying question here is: where should NGOs obtain their funding? The 
problem is particularly evident with government sources of funding. Even though an 
organisation may be considered to be ‘nongovernmental’ (not formed or contracted by 
government), many NGOs still receive government grants or other forms of 
government (financial) support. Fowler writes, “when official funds predominate in 
their resource base an [NGO] has, in effect, traded a legitimacy and moral authority 
derived from civic rootedness for legitimacy by association with governments, i.e . 
legitimacy from the public domain” (2000:641). In addition, “a growing association 
with and dependency on official aid brings with it the danger that NGDOs act as 
conspirators, rather than partners, in a questionable approach to development and to 
promoting the interests of (poor and excluded) civic groups” (Fowler 2000:643).
Kaldor fears that the predominance of government funded NGOs causes smaller 
grassroots organisations and community-based organisations to disappear. Local 
values are overshadowed by those of the government-funded NGO (Kaldor 2003:92- 
93). Grugel also addresses the funding dilemma by pointing out that NGO 
professionalization causes marginalization; an independent voice from government is 
no longer present in society when NGOs become increasingly reliant upon government 
funding. The danger is that NGOs slowly become embedded within government 
networks, rendering themselves incapable of raising a critical voice to government. 
Grugel warns that while this problem may only apply to some NGOs, the whole NGO 
community is at risk of being painted with the same brush (2003:31 ).
James Petras, in a fierce critique of NGOs in Latin America, goes further than
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Fowler, Grugel, and Kaldor, writing that NGOs are undemocratic, do not respond to 
the needs of local people and, overall, do more harm than good. “ [NGOs’] programs 
are not accountable to the local people but to overseas donors. In that sense NGOs 
undermine democracy by taking social programs out of the hands of the local people 
and their elected officials to create dependence on non-elected, overseas officials and 
their locally anointed officials” (Petras 1997:13). This type of criticism has obvious, 
far-reaching implications: can NGOs in fact be as effective as they intend (or useful at 
all) if  they lack credibility with grassroots groups? Do their legitimacy and 
effectiveness decline if  they can only become involved with projects that meet with 
donors' approval?
In addition to being tied to government and unable to escape the funding
dilemma, NGOs face a more troubling structural critique. The argument is that NGOs
are fundamentally incapable of addressing the root causes of the problems facing
marginalized people everywhere. Stephen Commins succinctly explains the problem:
To put it in stark terms, they [NGOs] are becoming the delivery agency 
for a global soup kitchen, handing out meager comfort amidst harsh 
economic changes and complex political emergencies, in a world that is 
characterized by global economic integration and the social exclusion of 
low-income communities, as well as continuing and widespread levels of 
civil strife. In effect, NGOs are handing out bits of comfort, doling out 
cups of soup, to the victims of massive economic changes and to the 
survivors of brutal civil wars. While NGOs have claimed the right to a 
moral as well as programmatic voice in international affairs, their 
organisational legitimacy and operational impact are in fact being 
weakened (2000:70-1).
Although “doling out cups of soup” is important in the short-term, Commins’ critique
is that welfare roles or even advocacy roles do little  in the long-term to alter the root
causes of suffering. Grugel writes that those NGOs fulfilling an advocacy or welfare
role face the difficulty that projects are rarely long-term. NGOs operating in an
advocacy capacity, trying to address structural issues, may find that they are being
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pushed towards emergency relief efforts because it  is hard to convince the public and 
donors that advocacy is worthwhile (Grugel 2003:38). Keese observes that one of the 
major difficulties facing NGOs is how to translate “local-level successes into larger 
scale social change” (2003:7).
Also arguing that NGOs fail to address the root causes of the problems that
they denounce and rather only scratch their surface, Petras writes, “NGOs emphasize
projects, not movements; they ‘mobilize’ people to produce at the margins but not to
struggle to control the basic means of production and wealth; they focus on technical
financial assistance of projects, not on structural conditions that shape the everyday
lives of people” (1997:11). Michael Edwards also presents a critique of NGOs,
believing that NGOs are ineffective not for the many reasons stated by the authors
above, but because NGOs have always been unsure of their place in society:
NGOs have always been confused about their identity—part market- 
based actors providing a service at a competitive price; part social 
actors pushing for more radical changes in systems and structures. 
Although these two identities can sometimes be combined, they have 
very different implications for NGO roles and relationships. At some 
point all NGOs will have to make a clearer choice (1998:online).
This choice involves either becoming a firmly market-oriented NGO with a particular
focus (humanitarian aid, micro-finance) or becoming more rooted in the community in
which the NGO serves, while adopting clearer and better-defined stances on issues in
order to aim for social and political change. This second route often involves forgoing
funding opportunities (Edwards 1998). Edwards agrees with Petras that the pressure
on NGOs to conform to the standards of donor agencies is great, however Edwards
believes that this standardization is not inevitable: “it is possible for NGOs to play a
creative and radical role in social policy without being co-opted or stifled by
bureaucracy” (1998). lion as well suggests that it  is possible for an NGO to remain
vigilant in its original goal to provide the best services and avoid the temptation to
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focus on increased market-share of funds. According to lion, the traps in the global
economic system can be avoided by
hav[ing] a goal that is non-market-based and retain[ing] this goal; 
build[ing] power, influence and size (market share) on knowledge 
(about the goal and with an eye towards empowerment) rather than 
market value (financial size); reinvest [ing] in human resources rather 
than in marketing strategies; [and by] recogniz[ing] that its 
empowerment strategies may overlap with those of market-based 
donors but the long-term goals differ (lion 1998).
Commins also acknowledges that there is still hope for NGOs. The challenge for NGOs 
is to recognize their shortcomings and to adapt accordingly. Commins suggests that if 
NGOs could form partnerships with like-minded research groups and donors, as well as 
with other NGOs, the resulting network could strengthen each NGO’s ability to 
construct meaningful policies and alleviate some of the problems discussed above 
(Commins 2000:73).
For Fowler, the solution for NGOs is to reinvent themselves in a role Fowler 
calls “civic innovation”. “Civic innovation is the creation of new or modification of 
existing conventions, structures, relations, institutions, organisations and practices for 
civic benefit demonstrated by ongoing, self-willed citizen engagement and support” 
(Fowler 2000:649). The goal for an NGO that defines itself as a civic innovator is 
similar to Commins’ networking suggestion. Solutions to social problems can be 
addressed if NGOs both support and are supported by individuals and organisations 
who are committed to looking at these problems from a structural perspective (Fowler 
2000:651). These critiques have relevance for this thesis and will be referred to in 
Chapter Four. There three roles are suggested for NGOs to play in Colombia’s 
indigenous movement; these roles take into account the above critiques.
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Conclusion
The goal of this chapter has been to familiarize the reader with recent 
literature on the identity and roles played by these ever proliferating entities known 
as NGOs. The NGOs examined in this thesis are those which could be called 
‘development’ NGOs; they explicitly do not have a profit motive and work to benefit 
poor and underprivileged members of a population. Development NGOs often work 
within several different areas, including human rights, women’s rights, the 
environment, education, as well as development. Because this thesis focuses on 
development NGOs, several roles were identified within which such NGOs often work. 
These include research and advocacy, lobbying, welfare, and capacity-building, which 
are representative of the roles filled by the case study NGOs in Chapter Four. As NGOs 
increasingly enter mainstream development discourse, however, more and more 
critiques surface surrounding the actual impact NGOs have, stemming from some 
NGOs’ over-reliance on government funding and their tendency to operate only in the 
short-term. This chapter was designed to function as a basis from which to 
understand the case study and the questions posed by this thesis. How have North 
American NGOs interacted with the indigenous movement in Colombia and what roles 
should they play? Do the above critiques have specific relevance to these NGOs? 
Chapter Two seeks to bring the reader to an understanding of what is meant by the 
term ‘social movement’ and to answer such questions as: ‘How does a social 
movement work?’ and ‘How can one recognize a social movement?’ . These are crucial 
questions as one of the stated aims of this thesis is to fill the identified gap in current 
knowledge about the relationship between NGOs and social movements.
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CHAPTER TWO 
Social Movements: Origins and Characteristics
The relationship between NGOs and social movements is understudied and 
poorly understood. Although extensive work has been done on defining NGOs and 
categorizing their activities, Fisher writes that the relationship between NGOs and 
social movements has been ignored because NGOs working in this realm are often 
stereotyped as ‘social development agencies’ , “which ignores evidence that NGOs 
often initiate or sustain social movements or are the institutional vehicles that 
articulate protest and collective action” (Fisher 1997:45). Korten as well writes, “the 
power of people’s movements has largely been ignored in the field of development. 
Attention has been focused on money rather than social energy as the engine of 
development” (1990:124). This thesis contributes to the filling of this identified gap 
in current knowledge about NGO activities by concentrating on the example of 
indigenous movements in Colombia.
In order to adequately explore the relationship between social movements and 
NGOs, an understanding of the meaning of the term ‘social movement’ is required. 
This chapter will first draw upon the work of several social movement theorists, 
including Wilson (1973), Tilly (2004), and Colas (2002), who each supply an 
understanding of the concept of a social movement. This first section will also take 
stock of the many terms that are closely related to the term ‘social movement’ such 
as ‘social movement organisation’ , ‘transnational social movement organisation’, and 
‘global civil society’ and then clarify what the term ‘social movement’ w ill mean in 
the context of this study. Next, the origin of social movements w ill be explored 
leading into a discussion of what factors must necessarily be present for a social group
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to transform into a social movement. This discussion is an introduction to the 
eventual explanation of why Colombian indigenous groups together fit the criteria of 
social movement. The final section will explore what causes a social movement to 
become transnational and how information flows within small social movements and 
transnational social movements. This entire chapter is intended to act as a framework 
within which to situate my case study of the indigenous movement in Colombia.
What is a Social Movement?
Understanding the meaning of the term ‘social movement’ and some basic 
theories of social movement emergence and growth is crucial for later chapters. 
Although much has been written about what a social movement is (for example see 
McAdam 2003, Diani 8t McAdam 2003, Wilson 1973, Tilly 2004), I will highlight only 
select definitions here as others are beyond the scope of this thesis. First, John 
Wilson writes, “a social movement is a conscious, collective, organised attem pt to 
bring about or resist large-scale change in the social order by noninstitutionalized 
means" (1973:8). Wilson believes that the evolution of a new social movement means 
that the current order is being challenged, that people have new hopes and desires 
and strongly believe that the world can be a better place. Charles Tilly recognizes 
that the term ‘social movement’ is a variable term, owned by no one, open to 
interpretation, and free to be used by many different actors (Tilly 2004:7). Tilly, an 
influential social movement theorist, then lays out his criteria for what a social 
movement means within the context of his work. Although Tilly is referring to social 
movements that have evolved in Europe and North America, his writings on what 
constitutes a social movement are applicable in other regions, including Latin 
America. Tilly writes that a social movement is “a political complex” which combines
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“campaigns of collective claims on target authorities, an array of claim-making 
performances including special-purpose associations, public meetings, media 
statements, and demonstrations, public representations of the cause’s v/orthiness, 
unity, numbers, and commitment” (2004:7). Alexander Colas’ definition is similar to 
that of Tilly and Wilson: “a sustained and purposeful collective mobilization by an 
identifiable, self-organised group in confrontation with specific power structures, and 
in pursuit of socio-economic and political change” (Colas 2002:67). Colas, like Tilly, 
recognizes that there are many expressions of collective agency and identifies three 
ways to distinguish social movements from political parties, religious associations, and 
NGOs. First, “a social movement must have the capacity to mobilize its constituency 
or membership, second, such mobilization must be sustainable over a period of tim e” 
and third, it must be “steering history into specific directions through self-conscious 
collective action” (Colas 2002:67-8). Tilly cautions his readers against associating 
organisations and networks that support a movement as constituting the movement 
itself. He argues that the rich social fabric of a social movement, made up of complex 
relationships between various social acto rs-“activists, constituents, targets, 
authorities, allies, rivals, enemies, and audiences”- is  easily overlooked by those who 
consider a social movement to be a “single unitary actor” (Tilly 2004:6-7).
At what point do a group’s actions coalesce to form a social movement? 
According to Mario Diani (2003:301), there are three criteria for a social movement. 
First, there must be the presence of a social conflict around which a network 
organizes activities designed to oppose other social actors with whom the network is 
conflicting. Second, the members of the network, whether they be organisations or 
individuals, must recognize that a collective identity necessitates a collective effort. 
This means that the different factions that make up a network must see the broader
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whole and realize that everyone shares the similar goals and long-term interests. 
Finally, Diani writes that there must be an exchange of “practical and symbolic 
resources through informal networks" (2003:301). Doug McAdam (2003:291) also 
attempts to answer this question and notes that two prerequisites for a group to 
mobilize are adequate resources and a strong organisational base. McAdam also 
recognizes that there are several factors which motivate a group to organize. First, a 
social group must recognize the presence of a threat or opportunity for that group to 
act upon and around which to mobilize. Next, McAdam argues that local leaders have 
a crucial role to play in rallying existing networks of social groups around relevant 
contentious issues. Finally, innovative action is key to m obilization-“action that, by 
its contentious nature, departs from previous collective routines” (McAdam 2003:293). 
In Chapter Three it  will become apparent that all of these factors are present within 
the indigenous movement in Colombia.
For the purposes of this thesis, I will take Alexander Colas’ definition of a 
social movement: “a sustained and purposeful collective mobilization by an
identifiable, self-organised group in confrontation with specific power structures, and 
in pursuit of socio-economic and political change” (Colas 2002:67). I believe this 
definition encompasses the social movement criteria discussed above, and fits within 
the writings of Tilly, McAdam, Diani, and Wilson, outlined previously. In particular. 
Colas’ definition acknowledges Tilly ’s requirement that a social movement address 
target authorities through public demonstrations and other gatherings (Tilly 2004:7), 
McAdam’s recognition of the importance of adequate resources and local leaders 
(ability to self-organize) (McAdam 2003:291), Diani’s condition that a social movement 
organize around a collective identity (Diani 2003:301), and finally, utilizes Wilson’s 
component that a social movement must aim to bring about or resist large-scale
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change in the social order (Wilson 1973:8). Colas’ definition is clear and concise and 
adequately describes the indigenous movement in Colombia, as will be shown in the 
following chapter.
Within social movement discourses, several related terms frequently emerge 
which can create confusion about the meaning of the term ‘social movement’ . For 
example, ‘transnational advocacy network’ (TAN) is a term coined by Margaret Keck 
and Kathryn Sikkink in their 1998 book Activists Beyond Borders. According to the 
authors, a TAN “includes those relevant actors working internationally on an issue, 
who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges 
of information and services [...]  Activists in networks try not only to influence policy 
outcomes, but to transform the terms and nature of the debate” (1998:2). Within 
such a network, values and ideas are central, it is believed that individuals can make a 
difference, and information is used creatively in order to advance the common cause. 
Some characteristics of a TAN, write Keck and Sikkink (1998), are that they are 
composed of a small number of activists from each organisation involved in the 
network, mass mobilization is rare (with the exception of boycotts), they work to 
promote a cause or idea, and they advocate policy change. A TAN is not a social 
movement: social movements are not necessarily transnational (although they can 
be); TANs can arise suddenly around a pressing single issue and disappear just as 
quickly, whereas social movements are more sustainable over a longer period of time; 
the main function of a TAN is to share information about an issue in order to build 
support for a policy which the TAN can then advocate while social movements are 
more concerned with mobilizing and organizing collective action (Keck 8t Sikkink 
1998:various pages).
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Another term often found within discussion of social movements is ‘social 
movement organisation’ (SMO). Smith et al. specify that SMOs are “formal groups 
explicitly designed to promote specific social changes” and are the “principal carriers 
of social movements” (Smith et al. 1997:60). Mario Diani adds that SMOs are “those 
groups who identify themselves and are identified by others, as part of the same 
movement and exchange on that basis” (2003:305). More specifically, transnational 
social movement organisations (TSMOs) are those social movement organisations which 
“work specifically for some social or political change and operate an international 
office or secretariat to serve a membership active in more than two states” (Kriesberg 
1997:22), examples of which are Greenpeace and Amnesty International (Kriesberg 
1997:16). The obvious difference between social movements and SMOs or TSMOs is 
that social movements are more general, encompassing the latter two groups as well 
as other actors.
Finally, within the rubric of ‘social movement’ is the term ‘global civil 
society’ . Keane defines global civil society as “a vast, sprawling non-governmental 
constellation of many institutionalised structures, associations, and networks within 
which individual and group actors are interrelated and functionally interdependent” 
(2003:11). It is clear from Keane’s definition that global civil society is actually the 
aggregate of the many different social movements and other non-state actors that 
exist on the world stage. The term ‘global civil society’ has little  relevance for the 
current discussion in this chapter, but I mention it  so that confusion due to these many 
terms may be lessened.
37
Origins of Social Movements
The question of where social movements come from and how they emerge is 
important to answer in order to give a more thorough understanding of what social 
movements are and what their significance is in political science and international 
relations discourses. McAdam, in his 2003 work Beyond Structural Analysis, takes us 
through several theories behind the emergence of social movements, in the 1950s, it 
was believed that, in order for a social movement to form, a dramatic change in 
society needed to take place, for example industrialization or urbanization, since such 
dramatic changes in society inevitably produced the requisite winners and losers and 
disintegration of societal norms. Social movements were thought to arise with the 
intention of restoring social norms after such a breakdown of social order. However, 
the arrival of the 1960s and the events that took place during this decade challenged 
this prevailing theory coming out of the 1950s. Social movement theorists began to 
hypothesize that it is not the most disorganised factions of society who organize but 
rather pre-existing, established groups and networks (known as mobilizing structures). 
This new theory, however, does not challenge the hypothesis that social movements 
emerge during times of societal instability and change (McAdam 2003: 282).
For some issues, the aim of a small social movement may be to grow into a 
transnational social movement. Halperin 6t Laxer write that a social movement 
becomes transnational when there is regular, frequent interactions across nations and 
when a consensus is formed in a universal language (2003:8). A good example of a 
transnational issue is human rights, and the many organisations around the world that 
are working to advance the concept of an internationally enforced and respected 
standard of human rights. Amnesty International is at the forefront of this social 
movement and is active in many countries. With perhaps the exception of the
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movement around reform of international institutions such as the World Bank or 
International Monetary Fund, social movements are (generally) restricted to change at 
the national level, regardless of whether or not it  operates at the small community 
level or at an international level. Although the human rights movement seems to 
transcend the auspices of any particular state (the movement involves people from 
numerous countries and organisations all over the world and the issue itself seeks to 
surpass the state level), due to the absence of any global state, the movement must 
still work within state boundaries to advance its goal (Halperin fit Laxer 2003:9).
McAdam argues that growth of a movement has everything to do with how 
information is spread and transferred within the movement. According to McAdam, 
two types of localized action exist, which he calls brokerage and diffusion. Brokerage 
consists of “information transfers that depend on the linking of two or more previously 
unconnected sites” (McAdam 2003:294). This type of localized action allows a 
movement “to transcend the typically segmented lines of interaction which 
characterize social/political life” (McAdam 2003:294). Diffusion differs from 
brokerage as information is transferred “along established lines of interaction” 
(McAdam 2003:294). Although a movement that spreads via diffusion “will almost 
always remain narrower in [its] geographic and/or institutional locus than if  it had 
spread via brokerage”, diffusion and brokerage will often combine in large-scale 
movements (McAdam 2003:294).
“Attribution of similarity” is another mechanism identified by McAdam through 
which social movements grow. McAdam defines ‘attribution of similarity as “the 
identification of actors in different sites as being sufficiently similar as to justify a 
common action” (McAdam 2003:295). In other words, a common identification is 
essential for the growth of a movement and most people need more than just
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information to cause them to “adopt a new idea, cultural object, or behavioural 
practice” (McAdam 2003:295). In this present case study, identification as a member 
of an indigenous group is such an “attribution of similarity.”
The final mechanism that allows social movements to grow is “emulation”— 
that is, emulation of the collective actions of others. Groups will likely engage in 
action that is known to be not only effective, but safe. Groups frequently weigh the 
costs and benefits of engaging in any action, even one that the group strongly 
identifies with, “out of fear or a sensible desire to monitor the reaction of 
authorities” (McAdam 2003:296). While many social movements engage in what might 
seem to be dangerous actions, groups will only engage in such activities if the benefits 
are seen to be great enough. In short, the effectiveness of dangerous actions are 
weighed against the dangers of such actions and the potential rewards to be gained.
Conclusion
The relationship between social movements and NGOs is one that has not been 
investigated thoroughly by either NGO or social movement theorists. As was discussed 
in Chapter One, NGOs who work with social movements have been classified by Korten 
(1990) as ‘Fourth Generation NGOs’ (those organisations that work to mobilize groups 
and individuals around ‘a social vision’ ), however, little  work has been done to 
determine in what roles these NGOs operate and how effective they can be. In this 
second chapter I have briefly explored the topic of social movements, using the 
writings of well known social movement theorists to explain what social movements 
are, where they come from, and how they grow. I have settled on Colas’ definition of 
a social movement - “a sustained and purposeful collective mobilization by an 
identifiable, self-organised group in confrontation with specific power structures, and
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in pursuit of socio-economic and political change” (Colas 2002:67) - as a basis upon 
which to analyze the indigenous movement in Colombia. Chapters One and Two are 
the foundation for a small-scale study which contributes to understanding of the 
relationship between social movements and NGOs. Chapter Three will draw on the 
present criteria used to characterize a social movement in order to explain how the 
indigenous movement in Colombia fits within these parameters.
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CHAPTER THREE
The Political Situation in Colombia and Indigenous Movement Mobilization
In order to begin to comprehend what the situation is like for Colombia’s 
indigenous peoples, it is first necessary to learn about the violence that has come to 
characterize the country. It would likely be very difficult for an American or Canadian 
citizen to identify with daily life in Colombia, for one would have to imagine a country 
in near chaos. Although Colombia is considered a democracy, the elected leaders in 
the country can do little  to enforce laws on an unruly country that has some of the 
most varied territory of any country in the world. As Michael G. Roskin writes, “if  you 
don’t like the state in Colombia, you have some of the earth’s best terrain to avoid i t ” 
(2001:127). As a result, there are a few powerful groups in Colombia over which no 
one has control and all of which are violent. Buscaglia and Ratliff observe, “from the 
early 19^  ^ century to today, people in many parts of Colombia have been and are 
indifferent to, when they are not downright contemptuous of, the activities of the 
central government” (2001:6). Different parts of Colombia are controlled by different 
groups, so the average Colombian is represented by whichever group is the most 
influential in his/her particular region. This fractious balance of power is fueled by 
the drug market, in which every group has an interest.
In order to appreciate exactly what the indigenous movement is mobilizing 
around and in spite of, a more in depth explanation of Colombian national politics and 
the major actors in the present conflict is needed. Therefore, the first section of this 
chapter will bring the reader to a basic understanding of the main actors involved in 
the conflict and their interrelationships, starting with the guerrillas and moving on to 
the paramilitaries and the Colombian armed forces. This first section also details the 
U.S.-funded Plan Colombia and explains how it is changing the face of Colombia.
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Concluding the first section of this chapter is a description of the human rights 
violations that are an everyday reality in Colombia. Section two of Chapter Three is 
an explanation of who comprises the indigenous movement, explaining its membership 
and significance. This section draws on the criteria used to define what a social 
movement is, and using examples, demonstrates how the Colombian indigenous 
movement fits within these criteria. Chapter Three concludes with a brief section 
exploring the indigenous movements of Bolivia and Ecuador, highlighting the 
similarities among the factors that provided the impetus for indigenous communities in 
these two countries and Colombia to mobilize.
Politics and Violence in Colombia
Actors in the Conflict
This section will give a brief description of the main actors involved in 
Colombia’s armed conflict. While there exist a number of external forces and players 
that influence and impact the Colombian conflict, for example international 
institutions such as the World Bank or multinational corporations which have an 
interest in Colombia's rich resources, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to explain 
them here. Instead I focus here on the internal actors because they have a direct and 
often devastating effect upon indigenous communities in Colombia. This focus upon 
the internal actors will allow the reader to become familiarized with the most 
immediate threats to indigenous communities, which is the concern of this thesis. 
These actors include the Fuerzas Armadas Revoludonarias de Colombia 
(FARC)(Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), the Ejérdto  de Liberadon Nadonal 
(ELN) (National Liberation Army), the Colombian Armed Forces, and the Autodefensas 
Unidas de Colombia (AUC) (United Defence Forces of Colombia).
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The Guerrillas
The largest and most powerful guerrilla group in Colombia is known as the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and comprised roughly 18,000 fighters 
in 2003 (BBC News 2003:online). The FARC was formed in 1964 by Communist Party 
peasant groups that had rebelled against the government throughout the 1950s (Pardo 
2000:65). The FARC is responsible for the largest number of kidnappings in Colombia, 
amounting to about 21% of all kidnappings in 2003 (BBC News 2004:online). Although 
the FARC began as an alternative to the two traditional political parties-the Liberals 
and Conservatives, which have polarized Colombian society-today guerrilla warfare 
has become the principal occupation of FARC members. Kirk (2004) writes, “for the 
young men and women who continue to join [the FARC], war is now a culture and a 
reason for being-war as an end in itself, and an identity through which to view the 
world” (Kirk 2004:66).
The second most powerful guerrilla group is the National Liberation Army 
(ELN) which was formed by student movements inspired by the Cuban Revolution. 
Founded in 1965 and comprising about 5,000 members as of 2003, the ELN focuses on 
blowing up pipelines and destroying energy infrastructure (BBC News 2003:online). 
The ELN is largely financed through kidnapping and extortion (Center for International 
Policy, 2002, online) and was believed to be responsible for 11% of all kidnappings in 
Colombia in 2003 (BBC News 2004:online).
In the 1970s, drug trafficking became a huge business in Colombia where drug 
exporters were producing 70% of the world’s supply of marijuana and turning the 
traditional Andean crop of coca into two of the most addictive and dangerous drugs in 
the world, cocaine and crack cocaine. During this time, three main drug cartels 
(Medellin, Atlàntico, and Cali) were formed in Colombia and these groups controlled
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the vast majority of the drug exports. By 1985, Colombia’s drug revenue was $3 
billion of the country’s $40 billion GNP (Pardo 2000:66). In the late 1980s, however, 
massive anti-cartel operations led by the Colombian National Police and U.S. law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies managed to break up these cartels (Buscaglia 
and Ratliff 2001:5). Today the FARC and the ELN exert control over many coca- 
growing regions throughout Colombia and have direct and indirect control of more 
than 75% of the distribution and 42% of the production of cocaine grown on 136,000 
hectares of coca fields. 50-65% of the FARC’s financing comes from drug-related 
activities while this is true for 63% of the ELN’s financing (Buscaglia and Ratliff 
2001:5).
Drug trafficking has become a very lucrative business for the guerrilla 
movements. In FARC-controlled areas, the guerrilla group acts as a government and is 
able to levy taxes on every step of the drug trafficking process, from the chemicals 
used to manufacture base (raw cocaine) to the product sold in weekly street markets. 
It is unclear how much the FARC actually earns from the coca trade, but estimates 
range from U.S. $36 million to U.S. $200 million (Kirk 2004:235). The FARC uses its 
money to buy weapons, to fund the movement as well as to set up municipal services 
for the people in FARC-controlled areas (Roskin 2001:131).
The Paramilitaries and the Colombian Armed Forces
The largest paramilitary group is known as the United Self-Defence Forces of 
Colombia (AUC) and is an umbrella organisation of 10,000 members (BBC News 
2003:online). Paramilitary groups, which by and large support and protect right-wing 
interests, were formed in several different ways. Some were organised and financed 
by drug traffickers, others by local landowners and military officers looking to protect
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their interests against guerrilla incursion and to suppress peasant demand for land 
reform. Lastly, a number of paramilitary groups were organised by the Colombian 
Armed Forces, aided by U.S. military advisers, as part of a national counterinsurgency 
strategy to confront the guerrillas in places where the military was weak (LeoGrande 
and Sharpe 2000). The AUC claims to provide security in the absence of a Colombian 
state and has largely won the approval of Colombia’s middle class (Roskin 2001- 
02:131). Ironically, just like the guerrillas, paramilitary groups are heavily financed by 
drug money in one way or another: by trafficking drugs themselves, accepting
payment directly from drug traffickers, or by collecting taxes from drug commerce in 
places they control (LeoGrande and Sharpe 2000). The AUC was responsible for 
approximately 9% of total kidnappings reported in 2003 (BBC News 2004: on line).
Some logistical support to the paramilitaries is given by the Colombian Armed 
Forces; such support is clandestine although the military-paramilitary relationship is 
well-documented (Human Rights Watch 2005, UNHCHR 2005, U.S. Department of State 
2004a). The ties between the military and paramilitaries is a very serious concern 
because paramilitary groups are blamed for about 75% of human rights violations in 
Colombia (Delacour 2000:63). Human rights groups such as Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch have criticized the U.S. government for blatantly ignoring its own 
human rights conditions on military aid to Colombia. For instance, in 2000, U.S. 
President Bill Clinton exercised the option to waive the human rights stipulations upon 
$600 million in funding to the Colombian army forcing him to concede that the 
military does not meet even the most basic human rights requirements (LeoGrande 
and Sharpe 2000:9). On January 10, 2002, President George W. Bush signed public law 
107-115 authorizing $380.5 million in aid to Colombia, mostly for its military; the 
military aid carried human rights conditions similar to those attached to the funding
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authorized in 2000 by the Clinton administration. On February 1, 2002, Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch and the Washington Office on Latin America 
(WOLA) met with State Department officials to present their findings that none of the 
human rights conditions had been met by the Colombian army (Human Rights Watch et 
al. 2002: on line). For example, condition (1)(1)(A) required the Commander General of 
the Colombian Armed Forces to suspend ranking security force members in cases 
where there is credible evidence that they have committed “gross human rights 
violations” or “to have aided and abetted paramilitary troops.” Reports show that 
such officers typically remain in active duty and still command troops (Human Rights 
Watch et al. 2002:online). Condition (a)(1)(c) required the military to break ties with 
the paramilitaries. According to the report, “solid and abundant evidence shows that 
collaboration between members of security forces and paramilitaries is the rule, not 
the exception” (Human Rights Watch et al. 2002:online). Despite this condemning 
report of the Colombian military. Secretary of State Colin Powell went ahead and 
released 60% of the available funds to Colombia (Human Rights Watch et al. 
2002:online).
What is Plan Colombia?
Plan Colombia is an extension of a plan laid out by President George Bush in 
1989 called the Andean Initiative. The Andean Initiative embodied the U.S. strategy 
of fighting the drug problem at its source-in foreign countries where drugs are 
produced. This was a five-year strategy which aimed to encourage Andean countries 
to fight drug production through institutional capacity-building, increasing the 
capabilities of local law enforcement and the military, and enabling these countries to 
break up drug cartels. The rationale behind this strategy was that these measures
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would make it more difficult and thus more costly for drugs to be produced, thus 
reducing the illicit drug supply. As a consequence of direct price increases and the 
additional effects of supply and demand economics, it was hoped that the street price 
of drugs would increase dramatically in U.S. cities, and thus discourage drug use. 
When Bill Clinton became President of the U.S., he initially declared that he would 
approach the drug problem differently than Bush by concentrating on treatm ent for 
drug users and education programs at home (Youngers 2004:129-130). However, by 
the mid-1990s, the Clinton administration had back-tracked on its plan to fight the 
drug problem at home and instead “dramatically increased funding for international 
counternarcotics assistance” (Youngers 2004:130). In 2000, Colombia became the 
third-largest recipient of U.S. military assistance in the world when the Clinton 
administration approved U.S. $1.3 billion over two years for a supplemental aid 
package specifically for Colombia which became known as ‘Plan Colombia’ (Youngers 
2004:130). In spring of 2001, George W. Bush created the Andean Regional Initiative, 
an approach to the drug problem that is similar to his father’s Andean Initiative. U.S. 
$1 billion in funding was approved for the Andean Regional Initiative in 2002, which 
still primarily targets Colombia but is “designed to address the spillover effects of the 
U.S. war in Colombia by providing assistance to its neighbors, including Peru, Bolivia, 
Ecuador, Brazil, Venezuela, and Panama” (Youngers 2004:130). The strategy to 
combat drugs at the production source in Latin America is called the Andean Regional 
Initiative while the funding that specifically targets Colombia is still known as Plan 
Colombia.
While Plan Colombia focuses heavily on military funding, it is possible to divide 
funding into two main categories: military and non-military. The U.S. states that its 
support focuses on helping “to fight the illic it drug trade, to increase the rule of law.
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to protect human rights, to expand economic development, to institute judicial 
reform, and to foster peace” (U.S. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law 
2000:online). The military component of U.S. assistance to Colombia in 1999 was 
$390.5 million and was given with the goal of taking control of drug-producing regions 
in southern Colombia (U.S. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law 2000:online). 
More specifically the money was used to support and train advanced counter-narcotics 
battalions, to purchase 30 UH-IH Huey II helicopters, 16 U6-60 Blackhawk helicopters, 
and 15 UH-IN helicopters. $115.6 million of the military funding also went to support 
the Colombian National Police and to provide them with two more U6-60 Blackhawks 
and 12 more UH-IH Huey II helicopters. In addition, $60 million was given to upgrade 
radar systems in four U.S. customs service P-3 airborne early-warning interdiction 
aircraft that detect and monitor suspected targets destined for U.S. and Colombia 
(U.S. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law 2000:online). Under the category of 
non-military funding, the U.S. is much more conservative with the national wallet. In 
1999, the U.S. set aside just $122 million for non-military aid (less than one-third of 
the almost $400 million military component that same year) which included technical 
assistance in areas such as human rights, judicial reform, and “other programs 
designed to support the peace process and strengthen democracy and the rule of law 
in Colombia” (U.S. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law 2000:online).
In 2000, funds for military spending were allocated more specifically than the 
previous year. $51.4 million was allocated to the Department of Defense for the 
training and equipping of counter-narcotics battalions, Colombian army aviation 
support infrastructure, and military reform. $365.5 million went to the Department of 
State to help with the purchases of more Blackhawk, Huey II, and UH-IN Huey 
helicopters, improvement of logistical support, and training and equipping of counter­
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narcotics battalions. The third category of military funding in 2000 was support for 
the Colombian National Police at $115.6 million. The money in this category went 
towards the purchase of weapons and ammunition, air mobile units, aviation facilities, 
spray aircraft for fumigation campaigns, and upgrades to the Huey II helicopters (U.S. 
Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs 2000:online). In 2000, the non-military 
component of U.S. funding equated to just $321 million (less than one-third of the 
$998 million spent on military funding this same year) which focused once again on 
promotion of human rights and the reform of the justice system, support for regional 
programs and the peace process, and support for alternative and economic 
development (U.S. Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs 2000:online).
More current funding figures for Plan Colombia are not presently available from 
the U.S. Government website. However, the San Francisco Chronicle has recently 
reported that in the last five years the U.S. has given $3 billion dollars in military aid 
to Colombia, amounting to one-seventh of Colombia’s entire military budget (Karsin 
2004). More specifically, the Center for International Policy reports that, in 2004, the 
U.S. government spent $549.7 million on military and police assistance programs in 
Colombia while spending just $149.3 million on economic and social assistance 
programs (Center for International Policy 2005:online). Colombia is consistently 
considered a country of strategic importance for the U.S. and in the years following 
the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, guerrilla groups in Colombia are 
increasingly referred to by the U.S. and Colombian governments as 'terrorist groups’ 
or narcotraffickers as opposed to ‘guerrillas’ . This changing discourse is evident in the 
RAND Corporation’s report on terrorist organisations, where the FARC is placed in the 
same category as Hezbollah and al-Q,aeda; groups which the RAND Corporation 
believes present hostile intentions to the U.S. and are capable of a high degree of
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violence towards the U.S. and U.S. interests (Cragin fit Daly 2004:20). Despite the 
extraordinary amount of U.S. money flowing to Colombia, the U.S. still has not clearly 
articulated its present and future goals there nor has it defined conditions of success 
and disengagement: “Three years into Plan Colombia, the Departments of State and
Defense have yet to develop estimates of future program costs, define their future 
roles in Colombia, identify a proposed end state, or determine how they plan to 
achieve i t ” (U.S. Department of State 2004a:30).
Understanding the types of weapons and the amount of funding available to the 
Colombian military is essential to gather a clear picture of what everyday life is like in 
Colombia. This knowledge underpins greater comprehension about how this conflict is 
being fought and what civilians, including indigenous peoples, face in trying to create 
a more peaceful society. The following section provides more detail on the human 
rights situation in Colombia and focuses on the position of indigenous people in this 
conflict.
The Human Rights Situation in Colombia
According to the U.S. Department of State, in the twelve months prior to April 
2004 there were 1827 kidnappings in Colombia (U.S. Department of State 
2004b:online) and the conflict caused the deaths of between 3,000 and 4,000 civilians 
in the year 2004 (U.S. Department of State 2005:online). Between January and 
September of 2002, an estimated 200,000 Colombians were forcibly displaced, mostly 
by the paramilitaries. In addition, 1.2 million Colombians have permanently left the 
country between 1999 and 2003 (Human Rights Watch 2003:online). The violence in 
Colombia has given the country one of the largest internally-displaced populations in 
the world (Human Rights Watch 2003:online). The number of yearly murders in
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Colombia is staggering; there were 23,000 homicides in 2003 alone (U.S. Department
of State 2004b:online). The political assassination rate is also incredible at fifteen per
day; most of the victims are unionists and human rights activists (Helweg-Larsen
2002: on line). Many rural people flee to the cities, away from the guerrillas and
paramilitaries that control the countryside. While some of the displaced choose to
flee to nearby Venezuela and Ecuador, internally displaced people often flee to city
centres, causing increased poverty and overcrowding there (Pardo 2000:67). As a
representative from the organisation MADRE explains, women are disproportionately
affected. “Women account for more than 55 percent of all displaced people, and
more than half of displaced households are headed by women...Most displaced families
end up in overcrowded and impoverished urban slums. Almost 60 percent of displaced
women have no job or source of income” (Kosek 2003:48)
Indigenous groups are affected as well, despite their constant declarations of
neutrality. As an anonymous indigenous person related to Edeli fit Hurwitz,
We have faced difficulties with a front of the FARC up to such a point 
that we had to go retrieve the bodies of seven massacred indigenous 
brothers on one occasion. They killed them simply because i t ’s not 
convenient for the FARC for us to organize ourselves and resist the 
politics that they have tried to impose on us, and which go against our 
principles as indigenous peoples (Edeli fit Hurwitz 2003:26).
Many indigenous peoples live in FARC-controlled regions, and often the guerrillas will 
force indigenous groups to grow coca for them and will coerce indigenous youth into 
joining their forces. Indigenous peoples have no stated desire to join the conflict as 
they are more concerned with securing land rights, campaigning against free trade, 
and developing social, educational, and health infrastructure in their communities. 
However it is extremely dangerous to stay neutral in this war. A declaration of 
neutrality to any of the armed actors is often seen as the equivalent of a statement of
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support for the other side. Both sides of the armed conflict - the guerrillas and the 
paramilitaries - wish to exploit the resources available in Colombian indigenous 
communities. Particularly for the guerrillas, support from the indigenous movement 
would lend legitimacy to the guerrilla cause. Refusal by indigenous communities to 
give this kind of support can result in violent retaliation. Therefore, a declaration of 
neutrality is a danger to the security of indigenous communities (Chomsky 
2002:online).
It is in the face of such fear and violence that indigenous peoples are 
mobilizing. The following section will describe the indigenous movement in Colombia; 
its goals, challenges, and successes. As will be shown, the determination and courage 
of the movement is remarkable.
The Colombian Indigenous Movement
The Colombian indigenous movement is a part of the invisible struggles' in the 
country. These are the struggles which are on going, require perseverence and 
courage, and which are rarely noticed by the mainstream media in North America. 
While the death toll and drug statistics are featured prominently in media coverage of 
the Colombian situation, rarely does the North American public hear about the 
organizing and mobilization of social movements, including the indigenous movement. 
The Colombian indigenous movement represents some of the most creative and 
dramatic organizing in Latin America. This thesis hopes to make those struggles a bit 
more visible.
The Colombian indigenous movement is by no means one homogenous, 
identifiable entity. It is made up of many different organisations and individuals with 
a plurality of ideologies and beliefs as to what direction the movement should take.
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Gow and Rappaport describe the movement as “a factionalized assembly of 
proponents of a broad array of forms of ethnic identity, organizing strategies, and 
tactics for struggle” (2002:47-48). However, indigenous peoples derive strength and 
unity from the reality that they are all threatened by the same violence and terror put 
forth by the guerrillas, the military, and the paramilitaries, as was discussed above. 
While the Colombian indigenous movement is for the most part embodied by the 
organisation known as the National Indigenous Movement of Colombia (ONIC), two 
other organisations are relevant to this study and also spearhead the movement: the 
Regional Indigenous Cabildo of Colombia (CRIC) and the Association of Cabildos of 
Northern Cauca (ACIN). These latter two groups were chosen for study because they 
are generally considered to be the best organised of all the regional indigenous groups 
in Colombia (personal telephone interview with Nicole Schabus, November 29, 2004 
personal telephone interview with Justin Podur, March 28, 2004). How is it that these 
two groups are both based in the same region? Before the three selected indigenous 
groups are described, the region of Cauca (where CRIC and ACIN are based) will first 
be discussed, in order for the reader to understand the importance of the region and 
why it may serve as a model for other indigenous groups in the country.
The tiny region of Cauca, located in the southwest of Colombia, is the 
birthplace of the broader Colombian indigenous movement. Joanne Rappaport best 
describes why the department (or province) of Cauca is so important: “the broadest 
and most inspiring array of alternatives has been presented by the various indigenous 
organisations of Cauca, a mountainous province with a considerable indigenous 
population in southwestern Colombia, whose ethnic movement has served as a model 
for organizing Native peoples throughout the country” (Rappaport 2003:39). Cauca is 
home to around 300,000 indigenous people, including Nasa, Guambiano, Yanacona,
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and Coconuco people (Rights and Democracy 2001:30). However, the most 
instrumental group in organizing and mobilizing the indigenous movement has been 
the Nasa. The second largest indigenous group in Colombia, the Nasa have been 
resisting domination in an organised way since the Spanish conquest. A quote from 
Arqufmedes Vitonas, the mayor of Toribio, the town that is at the heart of the Cauca 
indigenous movement, illustrates both the resilience and bravery of these people as 
well as the horrific situation they find themselves in: "With this war, they can kill 
many of us, but they cannot kill all of us. Those of us who live w ill continue with our 
work. Those of us who die, will have died defending our process” (Vitonas, cited in 
Podur 2004a:online).
In August 2004, Vitonas and several other individuals involved in the indigenous 
movement were kidnapped (Podur 2004a:online). Justin Podur, who reported this 
news on ZNet, had this to say about the effect on the Nasa of having their leaders 
kidnapped:
If he [Vitonas] were to read this, [...] he would probably remind me that 
the process is a collective one, that the power is not in the leaders, but 
in the people, and that no one can claim ownership from the 
movement's collective effort of resistance and autonomy. Maybe he 
would remind me, too, of the saying the Nasa live by: "Words without 
action are empty, actions without words are blind, and words and 
actions outside of the spirit of community are death." Kidnapping him 
won't stop the Nasa from resisting, building, or dreaming. But him and 
the others should be returned immediately (2004:online).
Shortly after the kidnapping, a large delegation of several hundred indigenous 
community members—including members of the Guardia Indigena (Indigenous Guard, 
see below)—marched to where Vitonas was being held and successfully brought him 
and the others home (Vieira 2004a:online).
The reason that the region of Cauca has become such an epicenter of 
indigenous organisation has to do with land rights issues in the area. Before the
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1970s, land in Cauca was divided into haciendas, or country estates, owned by wealthy 
landowners. These haciendas existed on resguardo lands: lands with limited
autonomy given to indigenous communities by the Spanish to be governed by an 
elected council, known as a cabildo. The resguardo situation is one that is unique to 
Colombia and does not exist in any other Latin American country (Findji 1992:116). 
Historically, in Cauca indigenous workers (terrajeros) paid the landowner for the 
privilege of working on his land, the landowner selling the surplus produce. Although 
the cabildo governed the communities, it was usually loyal to the local priest and 
other local political authorities (Findji 1992:116). Both local power structures, the 
cabildo and the municipality of the region (the local link to the state), were weak in 
comparison to the hacienda. The indigenous cabildo was constantly clashing with the 
municipality, which, under the law, could legally set apart some of the resguardo 
lands for settlement by non-indigenous people (Findji 1992:116). Cauca was the 
starting point for the wider Colombian indigenous movement because this hacienda 
system was a source of major humiliation and shame for indigenous peoples. In other 
parts of Colombia the hacienda system existed, but it was only in Cauca that it acted 
not only as “a unit of production but a territorial unit of domination as w ell” (Findji 
1992:116).
After independence from Spain in 1819, the national constitution did not 
recognize the existence of indigenous peoples and the aim of the Republic after 
independence was to co-opt them and transform them into peasants. As a result, the 
indigenous communities in Cauca existed under very difficult living conditions and 
many were forced to leave their lands to find more profitable work, often as labourers 
or domestic servants (personal telephone interview with Manuel Rozental, April 12 
2004). These terrible conditions were the fuel that was needed for a resistance
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movement in Cauca where indigenous people began to fight for their rights (Findji 
1992:116).
Today the struggle for land rights has culminated around the new Colombian 
Constitution, adopted in 1991, which guarantees an unprecedented number of new 
rights for indigenous communities. Despite the new Constitution, much protest and 
mobilization by the indigenous movement has occurred, because to date, few of the 
articles in the Constitution have been implemented (Jackson 2002, Dover St Rappaport 
1996). This failure has mobilized not only Nasa communities, but most, if not all, 
indigenous communities in Colombia. The most important part of this new 
Constitution was the creation of Entitades Territoriales Indigenas (ETI) (Indigenous 
Territorial Entities) that would act as distinct jurisdictions for indigenous peoples. 
Dover and Rappaport explain that an ETI is an area “within which particular social 
groups are expected to govern themselves according to their own cultural criteria by 
an Indigenous Council. [...] The ETI w ill serve as the intermediary between the national 
government or other entities, and the constituent communities” (1996:6). An ETI 
could include municipal centres, resguardos, rural neighborhoods, private property, 
and indigenous people as well as non-indigenous people (Dover & Rappaport 1996:6). 
However, much ambiguity surrounds the ETI legislation, which has caused much 
debate in indigenous communities across Colombia. For instance, it  is unclear if 
resguardos and ETIs could co-exist, if the ETI would replace the authority of the 
cabildo, or what would become of non-indigenous people living within an ETI. The ETI 
seems to be but the continuation of the age-old indigenous struggle for land rights 
(Dover & Rappaport 1996:6).
Along with land rights, indigenous people struggle against violence and 
oppression and for autonomy and peace on their territories. Most urgently in late
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2004, indigenous organizing has culminated around opposition to proposed free trade 
agreements between Colombia and the United States as well as opposition to the 
Colombian government’s constitutional reform proposals. At the forefront of these 
struggles are several indigenous organisations, explained below. The first regional 
indigenous organisation in Colombia began in the region of Cauca and is known as the 
Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca (CRIC). CRIC’s founding purpose was “to fight 
for land rights as a defense against severe repression from guerrilla armies and the 
national armed forces” and has since expanded to include the fight to preserve 
indigenous history, language, and customs (Jackson 2002:82). On February 24, 1971, 
CRIC was formed when indigenous people from all over the region of Cauca gathered 
in order to discuss how to win back their land from the hacienda system. The second 
gathering occurred seven months later, on September 6, 1971 and was attended by 
even more representatives from all over the region (CRIC Bulletin 1973: online). Since 
its inception, CRIC has been independent of political parties and government, and is 
controlled by elected Indian peasants. It is directed by an executive committee made 
up of three members and a governing board formed of two delegates (CRIC Bulletin 
1973:online). Since its inception in 1971, CRIC’s platform has consisted of seven 
goals:
1 ) Recover ressuardo lands
2) Increase the size of resguardos
3) Strengthen the cabildos
4) Stop paying land-rents
5) Make known the laws concerning indigenous peoples and to assist in their
proper application
6) Defend indigenous history, language, and customs
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7) Train indigenous teachers to teach in accordance with the situation of 
indigenous peoples and in their respective language. (ACIN online)
An over-arching goal of CRIC was to unite all indigenous communities in Cauca 
“around a program of defending social and cultural traditions, particularly the 
resguardo and the cabildo. CRIC’s ideology has also defined Cauca’s indigenous 
peoples as an economically exploited peasantry, seeking to make common cause with 
the broader movement of poor rural farmers in Colombia” (Field 1994:99). The NGO 
Rights and Democracy notes that “CRIC is like a mother-figure for indigenous 
organisations in Colombia, an inspiration to those struggling for their rights” (Rights 
and Democracy 2001:30). Today, CRIC’s platform has expanded and adapted to 
include such points as defending natural resources, strengthening the role and 
participation of women, and developing programs for youth and children (Rights and 
Democracy 2001:31). “CRIC is not only concerned with protest and denouncements 
but also with long-term, life-sustaining strategies related to agricultural development, 
an indigenous university, indigenous environmental protection, and legislation to 
protect indigenous rights” (Rights and Democracy 2001:3).
Within CRIC is a regional grouping known as the Association of Cabildos of 
Northern Cauca (ACIN). Basically a sub-organisation of CRIC, ACIN was formed in 1992 
and recognized by the Colombian government in 1994. The organisation functions as a 
support entity for the process of organizing northern cabildos in Cauca, shaping the 
ETI, and creating appropriate systems of education, health, and natural resources 
management. ACIN’s mandate includes developing and strengthening the justice 
system in indigenous communities, building a health and education system according 
to indigenous customs, morals, and cultural values, driving traditional economic
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development in trade and industrialization, and defending and conserving natural 
resources (ACIN website, translated by author). ACIN embodies seven large 
community projects in northern Cauca which are collectively known as Proyecto Nasa 
(Project Nasa); the significance of which will be explained in the next section of this 
chapter. ACIN has been instrumental in organizing a united opposition to free trade 
agreements (the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) as well as the proposed 
bilateral agreement between Colombia and the U.S.), to the Uribe government’s 
proposed constitutional reforms, as well as to the ongoing armed conflict in the 
country. Recently, in March 2005, ACIN organised a forum and consultation on the 
proposed free trade agreements, to conclude with a vote on the question of whether 
indigenous communities should support or oppose these free trade agreements. Of a 
voting population of 68,448 people, 51,330 voted: 50,305 voted in opposition to the 
free trade initiatives and 691 voted in support of them (ACIN website). According to a 
Council of Canadians fact sheet, the FTAA would weaken the power of governments to 
create laws that would protect the environment, social services, and culture within its 
borders, essentially placing democracy under corporate control and that of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) (Council of Canadians 2002:2). This is problematic for 
indigenous communities as it  is doubtful that the World Trade Organization would 
have any interest in protecting indigenous lands and instead of negotiating with the 
Colombian government, the indigenous movement would instead have to deal with the 
WTO. Likewise, indigenous communities fear that the authority of the Colombian 
government would be eroded if a bilateral free trade agreement were to be signed 
with the U.S., threatening the autonomy of indigenous communities in a similar 
manner as would the FTAA (Public Declaration of the Indigenous and Popular Congress 
2005:online).
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The creation of the nation-wide indigenous organisation known as ONIC 
(National Indigenous Organisation of Colombia) came about at the First Indigenous 
Congress in 1982 in Bogota, which was attended by more than 2,000 delegates 
(Jackson 2002:83). The mandate of ONIC, decided upon at the Congress, is “to defend 
indigenous autonomy, history, culture, and traditions and to continue the campaign to 
recuperate the lands of resguardos” (Jackson 2002:83). In 1983, ONIC was officially 
recognized by the national government and from this point became active in 
government programs (Jackson 2002:83). Jackson explains ONIC’s structure and 
composition:
ONIC’s structure, with its national office and thirty-five regional 
affiliates, has been likened to that of a labor union. Most of its regional 
affiliates represent more than one pueblo [people], and many are 
formed along departmental, rather than ethnic, lines (e.g. CRIC), an 
arrangement that sometimes results in a pueblo’s communities 
belonging to more than one regional affiliate. ONIC and its affiliates 
see themselves as transcending a territorial-based ethnicity, achieving a 
superior, supracommunity administrative level (Jackson 2002:83).
Representing 84 different peoples, “ONIC is the legal and legitimate national 
organisation representing Colombian indigenous peoples” (Rights and Democracy 
2001:14). ONIC’s platform consists of similar points as that of CRIC, among them 
defence of indigenous autonomy, collective ownership of land in resguardos, 
indigenous directed bilingual and bicultural education, control over natural resources 
located on indigenous lands, and solidarity with other social actors (Rights and 
Democracy 2001:14).
These three organisations - ONIC, CRIC, and ACIN - will be the focus of the case 
study of the roles that North American NGOs have played and should play in social 
movements. Because ONIC represents all regional indigenous organisations in 
Colombia and because CRIC and ACIN are among the most organised and influential of
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these regional organisations, I have focused on these three as representative of the 
broader Colombian indigenous movement. Each of the NGOs I examine in the next 
chapter v/ork either with ACIN, CRIC, or ONIC. But what makes ONIC and its regional 
affiliates a social movement? That question will be examined in the next section of 
this chapter.
The Indigenous Movement as a Social Movement
Based on the ‘Social Movement’ chapter earlier in this thesis, it can be 
determined that the indigenous movement in Colombia does constitute a social 
movement, according to the theorists who were reviewed in that chapter. In Chapter 
Two, Diani (2003:301) saw three criteria for a social movement: presence of a social 
conflict, recognition by the members of the group that a collective identity 
necessitates a collective effort, and finally that the presence of informal networks 
allows the exchange of practical and symbolic resources. Colas observed that “a 
social movement must have the capacity to mobilize its constituency or membership 
and, second, such mobilization must be sustainable over a period of tim e” (Colas 
2002:67). Along with Diani, Me Ad am included three criteria in his analysis: a social 
movement must recognize the presence of a threat or opportunity around which to 
organize, this action must be innovative, and local leaders play a crucial role in such 
organizing (2003:293). Tilly saw that a social movement must display “public 
representations of the cause’s worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment” 
(2004:7).
The first example presented to show how the Colombian indigenous movement 
fits within the social movement framework from Chapter Two are the land 
reclamations that took place throughout the 1970s. Land reclamation operations in
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Cauca began in 1971 after Guambiano and Nasa farmers attempted and failed to
resolve the land problem through the authorities. These farmers and members of the
newly-formed CRIC decided to undertake land reclamation operations themselves,
through the cabildo (Findji 1992:117). They secretly organised a platform based on
four principles: unity, land, culture, and autonomy. Next the farmers would
investigate the haciendas and find out who lived there and who owned the land.
Armed with this information the farmers planned strategies to move into these large
haciendas. However, it  was not just farmers who would do the actual reclamation.
Thousands would participate, including men, women, and children. The reclamations
would occur during the night and would take the form of building, digging the soil, and
cultivating this land so that within weeks it  looked as though they had lived there for a
long time (personal telephone interview with Manuel Rozental, April 12, 2004).
Although the communities knew that the land was their right, they still recognized
that there were other rights to be respected. As a result of this recognition, no
property was ever destroyed during the land reclamations. Findji explains:
Community members came and dismantled the house, roof tile  by tile, 
window by window, door by door. They piled everything up outside, 
and nothing was destroyed. Finally, the occupants were told. T ake  with 
you what you brought in, but the land is ours.’ The landowners’ cattle  
was also removed from the hacienda so that its occupants would leave 
(Findji 1992:118-119).
As can be imagined, the landowners did not retreat quietly in the face of the 
takeovers. They fought back violently, and in the course of the reclamations, more 
than 2000 indigenous community members were murdered. Despite constant attacks, 
the communities never backed down (Findji 1992:120).
Findji describes the Guambiano takeover of the Las Mercedes hacienda, which 
was owned by a senator. Her description shows the determination and strength that
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the communities derived from each other:
they [Guambianos] started by removing the pasture grass, cutting it into 
squares that they would then roll up and easily carry away. They did 
this as communities, organised by locality and supported by Paeces 
[Nasa] on several occasions. When the army showed up to remove 
them, the cabildo confronted the troops; with the massive strength of 
the community behind it, the cabildo then imposed a two-month 
deadline for the national government to consider not only a senator’s 
right to private property but the ‘principal right’ of a people who 
predated the Colombians in their territory, not merely brandishing the 
colonial resguardo title . The solidarity movement aided in the 
legitimation of this struggle. It assumed the need to recognize the 
rights of the Guambiano people, and it expressed this publicly by 
handing to the cabildo of Guambia in Popayan [the largest city in 
Cauca] a document signed in several cities of the country. The 
rejoicing came one year later, when the landowner sold or relocated his 
cattle and the community effectively gained permanent possession of 
Las Mercedes. (Findji 1992:123.)
These land reclamations were peaceful on the part of the movement and power was 
drawn through presence in numbers and spirituality rather than through violence. 
Referring back to the aforementioned social movement criteria, not only was this 
action innovative and conscious but it clearly demonstrates the capacity of the 
movement to mobilize its membership in great numbers and in a committed, united 
fashion. As was mentioned above, even women and children took part in the 
reclamations. This action was effective as well: close to 500 hectares of land were 
recovered in less than ten years (personal telephone interview with Manuel Rozental, 
April 12, 2004).
The indigenous defence system, known as the Guardia Indigena (Indigenous 
Guard), developed and practiced in Nasa communities in Cauca, is also evidence of 
innovative, conscious, and collective action. Since it  is a response to violence and 
human rights violations in indigenous communities, the Guardia Indigena is also 
evidence of the presence of a social conflict or threat around which to organize. The 
Guardia Indigena is, according to Rappaport, “a specifically indigenous strategy for
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expanding cabildo control to confront armed actors and to defend human rights in
communities” (Rappaport 2003:41). The Guardia is intended to protect indigenous
communities in Cauca and indirectly presents a solution to the problem of
militarization on indigenous lands. This system of defence is both spiritual and
confrontational, but always based on indigenous principles. It functions as a system of
early warning. Guards are positioned around the village, at good vantage points in
order to alert the community of approaching guerrillas, paramilitary, or army soldiers.
When any of these armed actors approach the village, the guards shoot off a flare and
ring bells to alert villagers so that everyone can come out, including women, children,
and the elderly, to confront the intruders. Armando Valbuena, President of ONIC in
2003, explains what happens next and the profound effect of the action:
They just tell the guerrillas that they must leave; with just sticks and 
words, they push them out. The conviction is their strength. They say 
that they will not allow themselves to be displaced. They don’t fight 
for recognition or resources, but for the respect for their territory. [...]
By strengthening this cultural-ideological aspect, the Nasa have more 
tools (Armando Valbuena 2003:14).
Often during such confrontations music and speeches are broadcast over a 
loudspeaker (Rappaport 2003:41). None of the guards carry weapons, instead each 
guard carries a staff made of chonta wood and from which hang different coloured 
ribbons; the staff is highly symbolic. The ribbons hold high spiritual value for many 
Colombian indigenous communities (Rappaport 2003:41). In addition to guarding 
indigenous communities, the Guardia Indigena is also responsible for controlling the 
movement of people and vehicles in and out of indigenous territories, spreading 
information to the communities, taking charge of events that occur in the territories 
(such as marches and assemblies) as well as defending human rights (ACIN website).
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Becoming a member of the Guardia is a reinforcement of what it is to be Nasa.
The strengthening of Nasa communities is a direct form of resistance and is of central
importance to the movement. Guardia members attend events that reinforce their
identity as ‘modern Nasas’- a  particularly important exercise for younger members of
the group (Rappaport 2003:41). Training to be a member of the Guardia Indigena
involves attending workshops run by the resguardos which teach the trainees about
indigenous history and human rights and “provide a broad new arena in which the
ideologies of indigenous organizing can be aired” (Rappaport 2003:41 ).
Spiritually defending Nasa communities is almost as important as a physical
defence, explains an anonymous indigenous community member in a 2003 edition of
Cultural Survival Quarterlv. Spiritual defence includes using traditional natural herbs
to protect against enemies since such practices reinforce indigenous identity and
emphasize the peacefulness and harmony of indigenous communities. The belief that
promoting spiritual, non-violent defences and showing deep respect for Mother Nature
will ensure that Mother Nature will in turn protect communities, saturates Colombian
indigenous thinking (Edeli & Hurwitz 2003:27). Edeli & Hurwitz explain:
While territoriality is vital to the survival of indigenous communities, 
cultural rules and regulations are also required for successful social 
reproduction and the maintenance of the physical environment. These 
cultural aspects of the existence of indigenous peoples are intricately 
related to the spiritual guidance provided by elders and the unique 
cosmovision of communities. Thus the strategies communities have 
devised for the defense of land and culture have often located physical 
resistance-violent or non-violent-within a spiritual-cultural context.
The resulting spiritual resistance, while at times ineffective against 
violent physical incursions, has at least the effect of reinforcing the 
cultural-spiritual cosmovision that remains a critical aspect of survival 
(Edeli & Hurwitz 2003:26).
Recently, in September 2004, the Guardia Indigena played an instrumental role 
in a massive march that took place in Colombia. While a march may not seem
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innovative (marches are often used by social movements as a show of solidarity and to 
raise public awareness of various issues), this particular march had unique features 
which are indicative of the indigenous movement's ability to mobilize in large 
numbers. The march, which took place between September 14 and 18, 2004, began in 
Santander de Quilichao and ended in Cali, a 100 mile distance along the Pan-American 
Highway. While about 25,000 people began the march, by the time the march 
reached Cali, that number had almost tripled to reach 70,000, constituting the largest 
example of indigenous mobilization in the history of Colombia (Vieira 2004a:online, 
Murphy 2004: online). Although the march was organised by indigenous organisations 
in Cauca, Afro-Colombians, campesinos, farmers, and trade unionists were among the 
marchers. The march was organised as a ‘minga’ , a Nasa word that has no direct 
translation into English but essentially means ‘an urgent meeting’ . If a minga is 
called, all the members of a community forgo whatever they are doing at the time to 
join together and do whatever is required of them (Vieira 2004b:online, personal 
telephone interview with Janeth Munoz, November 19, 2004). Importantly, this 
mobilization occurred in response to several threats: human rights abuses and violence 
on indigenous lands and across Colombia, the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) 
as well as the bilateral free trade agreement proposals currently being discussed 
between the United States and Colombian governments, and the constitutional 
reforms being proposed by Colombian President Uribe which include making Uribe’s 
re-election possible and limiting the power and authority of the Constitutional Court 
(Vieira 2004a: online). The march made stops in towns along the way, garnering 
support for “a political pact between indigenous peoples and social organisations, and 
towards a national agenda with which we will go out and traverse the country” 
(Valencia, quoted in Vieira 2004a:online).
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Innovation was present in two forms at this march, first in the form of Radio 
Payumat, a small indigenous radio station. Radio Payumat mounted a radio to a 
tandem bicycle, enabling the station to move freely about the march, interviewing 
those marching and broadcasting information and interviews to listeners directly from 
the march (Vieira 2004b: on line).
Second, the march was unique because of the role that the Guardia Indigena 
had to play. As well as escorting the crowd and maintaining the peace, the Guardia 
watched over the tens of thousands of people while they slept at the gathering place 
in a stadium in Cali (Murphy 2004:online, Vieira 2004a:online). As well, some 
members of the Guardia Indigena remained in their communities in order to watch 
over those who were unable to march, such as the elderly, disabled, or small children. 
This last action was necessary as indigenous communities had been threatened by the 
guerrillas that if  they left to participate in the march, the guerrillas would seize those 
communities (Vieira 2004a:online). Like the above two examples, this third example 
of indigenous organizing shows innovation, ability to mobilize in huge numbers, and a 
consciousness about the effects of their action. Importantly, this march also displayed 
a further characteristic of a social movement: that a collective identity warrants a 
collective effort. It was not only indigenous people who participated in the march: 
peasants, Afro-Colombians, and mestizo people were all represented. Those present 
at the march were organised around the common identity of being victims in a civil 
war, as marginalized people who fe lt powerless individually against the perceived 
threat of free trade and President Uribe’s proposed constitutional reforms. 
Furthermore, because the march encompassed indigenous as well as non-indigenous 
groups, the minga displayed the presence of informal networks between such groups
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and the ability of these groups to exchange practical resources (Radio Payumat and
the Guardia Indigena) as well as symbolic ones (information and strength).
A fourth inventive and innovative form of resistance by the Nasa takes the form
of plans for the direction and future of the community. This last example of Nasa
organizing began in the early 1980s, when a Native priest named Alvaro Ulcue began
what is known as Proyecto Nasa (Project Nasa), a series of Life Plans for the
indigenous communities of Cauca. Distinct from what might be termed ‘development
plans'. Life Plans are community projects designed around each community’s own
concepts of education, justice, economy, government, and environment. Although
Ulcue was assassinated in 1984 by the paramilitaries, the Nasa continued to build and
develop their Life Plans. Just this year, on February 19, the Nasa community in
Toribio, Cauca won worldwide recognition for its Life Plans from the UNDP’s
prestigious Equatorial Initiative for Sustainable Development, which recognizes
development plans that reduce poverty by conserving and restoring ecology. The Nasa
plan was given the top prize out of 600 entries from all over the world (Podur
2004b:online). Although Life Plans encompass many different areas, including
education, health, history, and language, only two examples of specific plans w ill be
given here. The first is reform of the primary school curriculum. The Nasa fe lt that
reform was necessary in order to inject more Nasa character into the curriculum, stem
the flow of culture loss from the community, and reverse the discouraging trend of
more and more children dropping out of school. David D. Gow, who has done
extensive work in Cauca studying indigenous Life Plans, elaborates upon the exact
changes made in the curriculum. According to Gow, the curriculum concentrates
on a mixture of the historical, the cultural, and the practical; the Nasa 
world view; indigenous systems of work; the Nasa language; the 
conservation and recovery of culture; and conservation of the 
environment. The proposal offers methodological suggestions, such as
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the importance of working with children’s dreams, of recapturing the 
rhythms of nature, of 'rescuing the reality and the origin of things,’ all 
the while bearing in mind that these efforts are directed towards ‘the 
rescue and strengthening of the Paez [Nasa] ethnic group and their 
importance in the national arena’ (Gow 1997:271).
Second, the Nasa have identified traditional artisanal crafts as an important 
way to recover a fading culture. Gow writes that supporting the production of 
handicrafts can “satisfy cultural, social, and economic objectives’’ (Gow 1997:271). 
CRIC, which had been encouraging such activity for some time before the idea became 
part of a Life Plan, had been supplying the community with wool, ideas, and designs. 
(Gow 1997:272). So far, the development of handicraft microenterprises has 
contributed to “social cohesion and solidarity” as well as a renewed interest in 
learning the Nasa language (Gow 1997:272). These two examples of components of 
Life Plans represent resistance to those who are intent on destroying indigenous 
communities. They are a means to reassert what it means to be Nasa, to strengthen 
Nasa communities, and, as a consequence, greatly increase the chance of surviving 
this difficult period in Colombian history.
The final requirement to be satisfied for the Colombian indigenous movement 
to be considered a social movement is the crucial role of local leaders, specified by 
Me Ad am (2003). Since the Nasa are so influential in the indigenous movement, I will 
focus on past leaders of Nasa communities who embody local leadership. The Nasa 
have had many notable leaders, the first of whom was a woman known as La Gaitana, 
in the mid-17^ *^  century. La Gaitana was the mother of a man killed by Spanish 
conquistador Pedro de Anazco, when he refused to submit to the Spanish crown. After 
his death. La Gaitana emerged as a warrior and led the first armed resistance 
movement against the Spanish (Weinberg 2003:online). The next major leader, Juan 
Tama, was the architect of the first political resistance movement by the Nasa. Tama
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petitioned the crown in 1670 to establish five Nasa resguardos. Three were eventually 
established in 1701 - those of Toribio, Tacueyo, and San Francisco - and still exist 
today. Manuel Quilo y Ciclos was another leader who was instrumental in the 
establishment of these resguardos (Weinberg 2003:online). Manuel Quintin Lame, 
possibly one of the most famous indigenous leaders, emerged in the early 20^ century. 
Lame was responsible for the land reclamation movement to regain resguardo lands 
and empower the cabildos. Lame’s mostly unarmed movement. La Quintinada, was 
partly successful to this end (Weinberg 2003:online). In 1975, a Nasa named Alvaro 
Ulcue (who was mentioned above in the Life Plans discussion) became the priest of 
Toribio. Ulcue began holding meetings to discuss land recuperation and empowering 
the cabildos. At the beginning, these meetings would take place at night or in very 
secluded areas in order to be as secret as possible. In the 1980s, the meetings took 
the form of open assemblies, and gave birth to Proyecto Nasa (Weinberg 2003:online). 
In November 1984, Padre Alvaro Ulcue was assassinated and no one has ever been 
convicted of his murder. Today one of the most influential leaders in the indigenous 
movement is Arquimedes Vitonas, mayor of the town of Toribio in Cauca. Vitonas was 
mentioned earlier in this chapter; he was one of the indigenous leaders kidnapped in 
August of 2004. Recently recognized as ‘Master of Wisdom’ by UNESCO and 2004 
Person of the Year by Colombia’s daily newspaper El Tiempo, Vitonas is representative 
of a Colombian indigenous leadership today that has nurtured the indigenous 
movement into one with an unprecedented amount of “strength, unity, and solidarity 
at the grassroots level” (Podur 2004a:online).
All of the above examples certainly demonstrate the indigenous movement’s 
ability to mobilize large portions of its membership over a period of time and to 
partake in conscious, innovative action. The above examples also show the movement
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to exhibit other traits of social movements mentioned in Chapter Two, including 
McAdam’s criteria of presence of a threat (violence on indigenous lands, the Free 
Trade Area of the Americas, Uribe’s proposed constitutional reforms), Tilly ’s (2004) 
public representations of the cause’s worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment 
(land reclamations, the march), Diani’s criteria that the movement recognize that 
collective identity necessitates a collective effort (the march) and that practical and 
symbolic resources be exchanged through informal networks (the march and Radio 
Payumat, the Guardia lndi§ena, strength, and information-specifically the 
educational initiatives).
This section of Chapter Three has demonstrated that the indigenous movement 
in Colombia embodies a social movement, based upon the criteria offered by social 
movement theorists represented in Chapter Two. By describing the indigenous land 
reclamation efforts, the invention and work of the Guardia Indigena, the immensity of 
the September 2004 march, and the Life Plans, Chapter Three has shown that the 
indigenous movement is sustainable and that its mobilization is conscious and 
collective. In the context of the political situation in Colombia and the violence under 
which the movement must do its work (described in the first part of this chapter), the 
coherence and organisational ability of the indigenous movement becomes all the 
more remarkable. The final section of this chapter will briefly describe the indigenous 
movements of Bolivia and Ecuador, in order to contextualize the situation of 
indigenous communities in Colombia.
Other Indigenous Movements in Latin America
In an effort to demonstrate that there are other active and well-organised 
indigenous movements in other Latin American countries, and place Colombia’s
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indigenous movement in this wider geopolitical context, the activities of two such 
movements are briefly described below. While indigenous movements exist in most 
Latin American countries, I have chosen Bolivia because of the momentous events 
occurring in the country at the time of this writing and Ecuador because it  is home to 
one of the most influential indigenous movements on the continent. It is worthwhile 
to note the similarities surrounding the economic and political conditions that 
provided the impetus for these movements (including the example of Colombia) to 
organize as well as the similarities of tactics used in such mobilizations.
Bolivia
Although Bolivia’s history of peasant organizing began in the 1950s, indigenous 
mobilization commenced in 1964 when Rene Barrientos’ military government came to 
power and began to erode the autonomy of indigenous and peasant communities. This 
was due to the new government's Military-Peasant Pact which moved resources and 
funding away from peasant interests to those of agro business and generally 
introduced policies that benefited large landowners (Yashar 2005:164). A huge 
monetary devaluation in 1974 coupled with dramatic economic reforms that increased 
the price of staples such as sugar, rice, noodles, flour, and oil and froze the price of 
agricultural goods led to major peasant protests and strikes (Yashar 2005:165). When 
the government responded to such protests with massacres, indigenous peasants in La 
Paz saw the need for autonomous organizing along ethnic lines (Yashar 2005:166). The 
most influential indigenous movement to arise at this time was known as the 
Kataristas, a group that emerged among secondary school and university students who 
were able to engage union networks in the countryside (Yashar 2005:169). The 
Kataristas, largely composed of Aymara Indians, organised around indigenous identity
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and built a platform around reinforcement of indigenous practices and customs, 
emphasizing the importance of being Aymara (Yashar 2005:170).
After the death of Barrientos, the Kataristas began to reorganize the national 
peasant confederation, known as Confederadôn Nacional de Trabajadores Campesinos 
de Bolivia (CNTCB) (National Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia), which was 
later renamed Confederadôn Sindical Ûnica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia 
(CSUTCB) (Confederation of Peasant Workers’ Unions of Bolivia)by its leader, Jenaro 
Flores (Yashar 2005, 178). Between 1983 and 1984, CSUTCB put forth an Agrarian 
Reform Proposal which contained provisions for cultural pluralism, communal labor, 
and communal authority for all of Bolivia’s indigenous movements. Although the 
Agrarian Reform Proposal was never brought to a vote, today it has been adopted by 
the new secretary general of CSTUCB, Felipe Quispe (Yashar 2005: 180-181 ).
In 1985, the Bolivian government began to introduce neoliberal reforms which 
dismantled many programs previously implemented to support peasant communities: 
wages were frozen, price controls and subsidies were removed on gas, petroleum, and 
agricultural products, and health and education spending was slashed (Yashar 
2005:182-183). Tin mines were closed, putting some 30,000 people out of work. Many 
of the now unemployed miners were indigenous, but could not return to their 
communities because of lack of land and lack of work. The only viable alternative was 
to enter the coca industry. In 1991, the first Andean Council for Coca Production was 
held, which elected Evo Morales as President. The movement which emerged from 
the increase in coca production and the 1991 Council became known as the cocalero 
movement. The mandate of the movement, which has only grown in strength since 
the 1991 Council, is to defend coca production as part of indigenous culture and 
tradition and has integrated many of the tenets of the Katarista movement such as
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cultural rights and autonomy (Yashar 2005:185). In 2002, Morales campaigned for the 
Bolivian presidency under the banner of a political party knov^n as the Movimiento al 
Sodalismo (MAS) Movement to Socialism, which is now the second largest in the 
legislature (Yashar 2005:186).
In 2003, popular movements, including the indigenous movements, united to 
overthrow the government of Sanchez de Lozada, mainly due to massive opposition to 
Lozada’s proposals to privatize Bolivia’s gas reserves (Dangle 2005:online). When the 
government of Carlos Mesa took power, the MAS and the cocaleros took a conciliatory 
approach to the new government, providing bases of support (Zibechi 2005:18). The 
issue of Bolivia’s gas reserves remained a contentious issue for Mesa’s government. 
Mesa decided to hold a referendum on the issue, in an attempt to pacify the social 
movements opposed to privatization. The referendum caused a marked divide 
between the cocaleros, who supported the referendum and the Aymara indigenous 
movement, led by Felipe Quispe and the CSUTCB, who advocated a boycott of the 
vote (Dangle 2005:online). Although 75% percent of people voted ‘yes’ to the 
referendum, no major decisions were made about what to do with the gas reserves. 
Frustrated, the once divided social movements came together to stage massive 
protests, including strikes, road blockages, and marches, to push for nationalization of 
the reserves. On June 7, 2005, these protests culminated in Mesa’s resignation 
(Dangle 2005:online). The insecurity and chaos that characterizes present-day Bolivia 
lends uncertainty to the future of the popular movements. However, one analyst 
believes that the popular movements will not relent in their struggle and will 
eventually bring about nationalization of the gas reserves (Friedsky 2005:online).
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Ecuador
The indigenous movement in Ecuador began in tv/o distinct regions of the 
country: the Andes and the Amazon. In 1973, land reform laws abolished the
Ecuadorian version of the hacienda system and included provisions for the introduction 
of education, health, and social security programs for the peasant population, 
overwhelmingly in the Andes (Yashar 2005:92). However, many of the promises 
enshrined in the land reform laws were never fully delivered, or in many cases, were 
unevenly accessible. Indigenous people, for example, although considered formal 
members of society, were subjected to racial discrimination, including segregation or 
exclusion from “public schools, hospitals, workplaces, markets, and state offices" 
(Yashar 2005:98). In response to such inequality, indigenous people began to 
organize, using social networks established within churches and unions (Yashar 
2005:100). In 1972, an organisation known as Ecuador Runcunapac Richahmui 
(ECUARUNARI) (Awakening of the Ecuadorian Indian) was formed, which was 
supported and funded by the military government of Rodriguez Lara, and focused 
mainly on land reform and distribution (Yashar 2005:107-8).
In the Amazon, indigenous communities politicized in the 1960s as the 
Ecuadorian state began to open up the Amazon to land developers, including 
agriculturalists and cattle farmers. Oil exploration saw a dramatic increase upon the 
discovery of oil reserves in 1967 (Yashar 2005:113-4). The negative environmental 
consequences of oil exploration provided the necessary drive for indigenous 
mobilization, which centered around the defence of indigenous communities (Yashar 
2005:116, Candial 1995:online). As in the Andes, churches provided the networks 
necessary to organize, and several local federations emerged as a result. The most 
prominent of these organisations was Confederadôn Nacionalidades Indigenas de la
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Amazonia Ecuatoriana (CONFENAIE) (National Indigenous Confederation of the 
Ecuadorian Amazon), which formed in 1980 in order to defend cultures and land, to 
demand the end of agricultural development in the Amazon, and to demand 
implementation of social programs such as education and health (Yashar 2005:129).
In the early 1980s, the two main regional indigenous groups - ECUARUNARI and 
CONFENAIE - began to discuss the formation of a national indigenous organisation. In 
1986, these discussions led to the founding of Confederadôn Nadonalidades Indigenas 
del Ecuador (CONAIE) (National Indigenous Confederation of Ecuador) (Yashar 
2005:130). CONAIE’s platform includes a number of demands of the government, 
including recognition that Ecuador is a plurinational country, the granting of lands and 
titles to these nationalities, the nonpayment of rural land taxes, officialization of 
indigenous medicine, and funding for bilingual education (Yashar 2005:146).
To date, the Ecuadorian indigenous movement has succeeded in toppling two 
presidents: Abdala Bucaram in 1997 and Jamil Mahuad in 2000 (Zibechi 2005:19). 
CONAIE then put its support behind Lucio Gutierrez, even forming part of his 
administration for six months before withdrawing (Zibechi 2005:20). This support for 
government and subsequent withdrawal has caused divisions within the movement and 
a corresponding uncertainty about its future. However, CONAIE held a Congress in 
2004 where the new leadership began to steer the organisation back to the grassroots, 
to the core of the movement (Zibechi 2005:20). Once considered “the chief social and 
political actor [...] and an obligatory point of reference for social movements 
throughout Latin America”, it  is likely that CONAIE will soon be able to regain its 
former power (Zibechi 2005:19).
Many similarities exist between the movements in Bolivia, Ecuador, and 
Colombia. In all three cases, indigenous peoples were considered inferior members of
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society and subjected to a variety of discriminations, including lack of land, poor 
economic conditions, social inequality, and little  or no access to resources such as 
health and education programs. The indigenous movements in all three cases 
mobilized to reverse such conditions, organizing around the concept of plurinationality 
and indigenous rights and autonomy. This final section exists as a reminder that poor 
conditions existed and persist for indigenous communities around Latin America and 
that indigenous communities are active and organised, rejecting complacency and 
striving to improve conditions for not only themselves but for other marginalized 
people in their respective countries.
Chapter Three has provided a political context within which to consider the 
indigenous movement in Colombia. The first section of this chapter examined the 
Plan Colombia and the human rights situation in the country in order to build a basis of 
understanding for section two, which concentrated on the different actions taken by 
the Colombian indigenous movement to show how it can be considered to be a social 
movement. The final section of this chapter acknowledged the existence of other 
vibrant indigenous movements in Latin America, focusing on those in Bolivia in 
Ecuador. Chapter Four will build upon Chapter Three by examining the four North 
American NGOs and their relationships to the Colombian indigenous movement.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
A Case Study of Four North American NGOs in Colombia’s Indigenous Movement
This chapter represents the culmination of all the research completed for this 
thesis and analyzes interviews conducted with representatives of four case study 
NGOs: Inter Pares, Rights and Democracy, Colombia Support Network, and En Camino. 
Part one of this chapter addresses the question of what roles these NGOs are currently 
taking on with the indigenous movement in Colombia. For each NGO, the underlying 
philosophy and principles of the organisation is examined (information is obtained 
directly from statements made on each NGO’s website - see bibliography for exact 
website addresses); the major challenges facing the indigenous movement according 
to the NGO’s perspective; what programs and what kind of work is being done with the 
indigenous movement and the successes and failures of such work and programs.
Part two of this chapter places the above analysis into the framework 
established in Chapter One. Based upon the different NGO roles investigated, the four 
case study NGOs are categorized and their work related to the criticisms also 
discussed in Chapter One. I discuss what roles these NGOs are playing or have played 
within the Colombian indigenous movement and based upon the positive or negative 
outcomes and the aforementioned NGO criticisms, I propose three roles within which I 
believe NGOs can operate most effectively in the context of the Colombian indigenous 
movement. The above assessments will be based both on the research contained in 
the first three chapters as well as interviews conducted with an expert unaffiliated 
with any particular NGO but who works in the field with elements of the indigenous 
movement.
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Part One: Case Study of Four North American NGOs 
Inter Pares
Inter Pares is a Canadian organisation that was formed in 1975. With a broad 
mandate to address poverty and underdevelopment caused by structural inequities, 
Inter Pares provides humanitarian assistance and human rights protection for those 
living in violence and attempts to “[link] social and economic issues at home with 
social change work globally" (Inter Pares website June 6, 2005).^ Underlying this 
mandate is the firm belief that the communities and individuals with whom Inter Pares 
works are equal partners working for the common cause of improving the world. The 
overall aim of Inter Pares is to establish “long-term commitment projects with people 
and groups working in mutual respect.” Inter Pares also believes that one of its most 
important contributions is “linking local communities with similar problems and 
experiences”.
In Latin America, Inter Pares works indirectly with local organisations through a 
consortium known as PCS (Project Counseling Service) which is made up of Action by 
Churches Together (Holland), Norwegian Refugee Council, Danish Refugee Council, and 
Swiss InterChurch Aid. PCS works mainly in the realm of capacity-building for Latin 
American organisations “to respond to the needs of uprooted and other populations 
affected by political violence” with an emphasis on the capacities and leadership of 
women. More specifically, in Colombia PCS works with Agenda Indigena, a group 
comprised of three organisations: La Central Cooperativa Servicios (CENCOOSER) (The 
Central Service Cooperative), Planeta Paz, and Fundadôn Mujer y Futuro. The goal in 
working with Agenda Indigena is to “create opportunities for our counterparts to learn 
directly from each other, by supporting mutual support networks and exchanges.”
 ^ Unless otherwise specified, a ll inform ation and quotes contained under the  heading ‘ In ter
Pares’ was obtained from  the  In ter Pares website and verified as accurate as o f June 6, 2005.
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This is done by helping colleagues to secure funding from international donors and 
directly financially supporting local project initiatives, notably both where the local 
organisations believe it would best help.
Inter Pares also has membership in a number of organisations in Canada, in an 
effort to form networks of advocacy and support for policy changes at home and 
abroad. These organisations include the Canadian Council for International 
Cooperation, Project Ploughshares, and the Canadian Council for Philanthropy. While 
it classifies itself as an NGO, Inter Pares routinely participates in government 
committees and produces policy papers and presentations for government agencies.
In terms of concrete organisation. Inter Pares is made up of fifteen full-tim e  
staff members who are divided into groups working in one of several areas: Latin 
America, Africa, Asia, and donor relations. The group operates around consensus- 
based decision-making processes. Because all staff collaborate in fundraising, 
programming, and financial management aspects. Inter Pares is highly transparent. 
Funding to Inter Pares is provided through both private supporters and the Canadian 
International Development Agency, “not through major publicity and fundraising 
campaigns.”
The relationship between Inter Pares and the Colombian indigenous movement 
is a somewhat distant one: the NGO does not work directly with indigenous 
communities in Colombia but rather funds programs through PCS, which has been 
working in Latin America for fifteen years. Despite what one is led to believe upon 
reading Inter Pares’ website, currently the organisation does not fund any programs 
(through PCS or otherwise) with or on behalf of Colombian indigenous communities. 
According to David Bruer, an Inter Pares staff member who focuses on the Colombia 
program, a program was initiated several years ago between PCS and three indigenous
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groups in the Chocô region of Colombia - Organizadôn Indigena Antioquena, the 
Organizadon Regional Embera-Waunan (OREWA) Embera-Waunan Regional Indigenous 
Organisation, and the Alto Sinu, all three of whom are members of ONIC. However, at 
the end of the first three years of the program, the indigenous groups came to the 
decision that they could not work with one another and the program ended (personal 
telephone interview with Bruer, November 11, 2004).
At its inception, the goal of that program was to bring the three indigenous 
organisations together in order to build their capacity to negotiate with the Colombian 
government and with other armed actors; ultimately, to increase participation from 
the Chocô region in the national indigenous peace agenda. Simply put, the goals of 
the program were to improve negotiating capacity at the regional level (Chocô) and 
increase the groups’ participation in national forums through ONIC (personal telephone 
interview with Bruer, November 11, 2004). In order to accomplish these goals, PCS 
hired people with negotiating skills to train the organisations in negotiation and in 
capacity-building, in order to strengthen them and their administrations. Funding was 
given directly to the indigenous organisations as well so that they could design their 
own policies and manage themselves (personal interview with Bruer, November 11,
2004).
According to Bruer, the challenge of this program—and in any program that 
deals with grassroots organisations-was the volatility of the groups: such
organisations, with little  administrative expertise, undergo constant leadership 
changes that sometimes include the upheaval of the entire leadership body. Bruer 
remarked that it is very difficult to build partnerships with organisations whose 
identity can change so suddenly. However, an alternative explanation for the 
project’s ultimate failure has to do with the very different realities of the indigenous
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groups. For instance, Organizadôn Indigena Antioquena was very well funded and had 
a more developed infrastructure than the other two organisations. The organisation is 
based in Medellin, a major city centre, and its staff was well educated. In contrast, 
the Alto Sinu group had no office and consisted of loosely-linked communities along 
the river. Since only one of the three organisations had the capacity to manage funds 
and produce reports, jealousies formed among the other two groups and grew to the 
point where the three groups could no longer work together (personal telephone 
interview with Bruer, November 11, 2004).
Although the program collapsed, Bruer believes that there were successes 
achieved within the three years that the program was functioning. Useful and 
productive discussions occurred between representatives of the three groups, certain 
members of the organisations were trained in the areas of administration and 
negotiation, and all three groups increased their contact with ONIC (personal 
telephone interview with Bruer, November 11, 2004).
Despite this somewhat distant relationship between Inter Pares and the 
indigenous movement, the organization has been included in this study because there 
is much to be learned about Inter Fares' experience with the project in the Chocô 
region. This was a capacity-building program that did not take into consideration the 
discrepancies between the indigenous communities who were forced to collaborate on 
the project. While some gains were made in the course of the project, as Bruer 
pointed out, its overall failure calls into question the effectiveness of capacity- 
building programs. Can NGOs based in North America carry out successful capacity- 
building programs in the South? While this thesis is unable to answer this question, a 
capacity-building role is not among the roles I recommend that North American NGOs 
play with the Colombian indigenous movement.
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Rights and Democracy
Although it defines itself as non-partisan, the organisation Rights and 
Democracy was formed by Canada’s Parliament in 1988. It is funded almost entirely 
by Canada’s Overseas Development Assistance Budget and its financial accounts are 
inspected by the Auditor General (Rights and Democracy website:June 6, 2005 
However, Rights and Democracy does not strictly fit David Korten’s criteria for a 
Governmental Nongovernmental Organisation (GONGO), that is that they are 
“creations of government and serve as instruments of government policy” (1990:2). 
Rights and Democracy certainly was formed by government, but it is unclear whether 
or not they actually serve as direct instruments of government policy. For the 
purposes of this thesis. Rights and Democracy will be considered an NGO for several 
reasons. First, Rights and Democracy declares itself to be a non-partisan, non-profit 
charitable organisation and states on its website that it “is an independent 
organisation at arm’s length from the Government of Canada.” It is also considered an 
NGO by the International Labour Organisation, the United Nations Economic and Social 
Council, and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. For these 
reasons, this thesis will consider Rights and Democracy to be a ‘pure’ NGO (in contrast 
with a GONGO, a subclass of NGO).
Based in Montreal, Rights and Democracy works around four main themes: 
women’s rights, globalization and human rights, democratic development, and rights 
of indigenous peoples. These four themes are addressed through urgent action alerts 
and ‘important opportunities’ bulletins as well as through international human rights 
advocacy work. This latter aspect of Rights and Democracy’s work consists of
 ^ Unless otherwise specified, a ll inform ation and quotes contained under the  heading ‘ Rights
and Democracy’ was obtained from  the  Rights and Democracy website and verified  as accurate
as o f June 6, 2005.
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partnering with human rights, women’s, and indigenous groups around the world, as 
well as with democratic movements and governments in order to enhance the work of 
human rights advocates.
The two roles filled by Rights and Democracy are (a) advocacy: “to inform 
public opinion and to call for policy changes with respect to the promotion and 
defence of human rights and democratic development” and (b) capacity-building: “of 
human rights institutions and programmes, especially with partners in developing 
countries, to enable them to pursue their advocacy activities effectively” (Rights and 
Democracy website:June 6, 2005). Concretely, Rights and Democracy provides 
technical assistance, training in popular education, action-oriented research, 
institutional strengthening, and actively encourages dialogue and networking between 
NGOs and their respective governments.
Rights and Democracy’s work with the indigenous movement in Colombia began 
about ten years ago and consists mainly of funding the women’s section of ONIC. The 
first project initiated between Rights and Democracy and the indigenous women was 
to build a continental indigenous women’s network across South America. Now known 
as the Continental Network of Indigenous Women of the Americas, this project began 
in July of 1995 with a conference for women from indigenous groups around South 
America. At first, the goal of the project was to make sure that ONIC would be part of 
this continental network. Since that goal was achieved. Rights and Democracy’s focus 
has shifted to addressing entrenched violence; to developing programs designed to 
help indigenous women in the region cope with Colombia’s armed conflict. This shift 
in focus has resulted in the continental network creating a commission on violence. 
Although this commission is in its early formative stages, it intends to involve Ecuador, 
Venezuela, and Panama (personal telephone interview with a Rights and Democracy
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representative who wished to remain anonymous [hereafter referred to as 
anonymous], November 22, 2004). According to anonymous, Rights and Democracy’s 
primary role within the women’s indigenous movement involves financially supporting 
the programs conceived and designed by the women, who submit funding proposals to 
Rights and Democracy, which reviews them and makes funding decisions.
Other work relating to Colombia that Rights and Democracy has been involved 
with includes a large joint mission to Colombia in 2001. This mission, formed by 
representatives from the Assembly of First Nations, Canadian Members of Parliament, 
and members of Rights and Democracy, had several objectives. These included 
promoting awareness of the situation of indigenous peoples in Colombia within 
Canada’s First Nations’ communities, strengthening policy and advocacy capacity in 
Canada, and supporting the peace efforts in Colombia, particularly among indigenous 
communities (personal telephone interview with anonymous, November 22, 2004). 
Although the report released after this mission contained many recommendations by 
Rights and Democracy, there is little  evidence that any of these recommendations 
have since been implemented. However, the mission did result in greater publicity 
around the human rights situation in Colombia (personal telephone interview with 
anonymous, November 22, 2004). Rights and Democracy’s role with Colombia’s 
indigenous movement can thus far be characterized as one of capacity-building 
(developing the continental network) and advocacy and research (the joint mission).
As for successes that Rights and Democracy has seen in its role with the 
indigenous movement, anonymous believes there have been some small ones. For 
instance, projects that Rights and Democracy was involved with helped raise the 
profile of the women’s movement within ONIC and helped the women’s desk within 
ONIC to become more respected. Also, there have been successes with certain ad hoc
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urgent action bulletins sent out by Rights and Democracy. Most recently, a bulletin 
was sent out to advocate protection for the large mobilization of indigenous people 
that took place in September, described in Chapter Three of this thesis (the march 
was not attacked).
As for failures, anonymous considers Rights and Democracy’s involvement in 
Colombia to be too small to have had any meaningful results. In order to improve 
Rights and Democracy’s effectiveness in working with the Colombian indigenous 
movement, anonymous proposed that the NGO should focus on one specific area. The 
project focusing on women and violence was a good first step, but anonymous would 
like to see Rights and Democracy establish a more certain and long-term role for itself 
in the country (personal telephone interview with anonymous, November 22, 2004).
Despite anonymous' claim that Rights and Democracy's involvement has been to 
small to have had any meaningful results, I feel that the organization's involvement is 
valuable for this thesis. (It is interesting to note that anonymous only fe lt that Rights 
and Democracy's involvement was too small to comment on failures, not successes.) 
The NGO is involved with connecting indigenous communities in Canada with 
indigenous communities in Colombia and raising the status of the Colombian situation 
among Canadian government officials. Although Rights and Democracy is faced with 
some problems due to its reliance on government funding (this will be addressed in 
section two of this chapter) I believe it is operating in roles that are useful for the 
indigenous movement.
Colombia Support Network
Colombia Support Network (CSN) is a grassroots organisation that relies on 
members and individual private donors for its funding (personal telephone interview
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with Cecilia Zarate, December 1, 2004). Based in Madison, Wisconsin, CSN strives to 
bring about a negotiated solution to the conflict in Colombia by strengthening civil 
society (including women’s groups, teachers’ cooperatives, unions, environmental 
groups, and indigenous movements). CSN is attempting to build an organised 
movement throughout the U.S. with chapters around the country (CSN website June 6, 
2005)’ .
The main focus of CSN chapters is the ‘sister city project’ which links each 
chapter in the U.S. with one or more communities in Colombia. States the CSN 
website, “we support the sister cities concept because we believe that it reflects the 
idea that civilian societies have a duty to be an integral part of the reconstruction of a 
social fabric that has been destroyed by the war. [...] Sister cities reflect a ‘people to 
people’ diplomacy that expresses the most beautiful qualities of a nation.’’ CSN 
chapters are involved in email, fax, and letter-writing campaigns to challenge the U.S. 
government’s policy on Colombia, as well as campaigns to pressure the Colombian 
government to honour agreements it has made with Colombian communities. CSN is 
also involved in providing material assistance for small projects that help to 
strengthen Colombian communities and sponsors delegations to Colombia every year, 
encouraging members of the press, U.S. policymakers, representatives from peace and 
justice organisations and labour leaders to take part. Another major aspect of CSN’s 
mandate is advocacy and publicity campaigns to make representatives in the U.S. 
Congress aware of the situation in Colombia and what impact the U.S. is having there.
The overall goals of the sister city projects, and of CSN broadly, are ambitious; 
some relate to Colombia and others to the U.S. First and foremost, CSN aims to
’ Unless otherwise specified, a ll inform ation and quotes contained under the  heading Colombia
Support Network was obtained from  the  Colombia Support Network website and verified  as
accurate as o f June 6, 2005.
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change the foreign policy of the U.S. government as it  affects Colombia. Second, CSN 
is working toward a negotiated solution to the conflict and the strengthening of 
Colombian civil society. Patricia Dahl, who heads CSN’s New York City chapter, 
pointed out in an email interview that providing solidarity with CSN’s Colombian 
counterparts and providing international (human rights) accompaniment (protection) 
are very important as well (personal email correspondence with Dahl, January 6,
2005). CSN’s strategy for accomplishing these goals is to create a grassroots movement 
in the United States which would be able to influence representatives in Congress and 
in the Senate. Creating CSN chapters across the U.S. is part of this process. Educating 
the public in the U.S. about the effects of their government’s involvement in Colombia 
is essential: Cecilia Zarate, founder of CSN, feels that most people in the U.S. have 
little  idea of the realities of war, nor do most have an analysis of the situation in 
Colombia (personal telephone interview with Zarate, December 1, 2004).
CSN has initiated sister-city projects with several indigenous communities in 
Cauca and in Putumayo, including one between the CSN chapter in New York City and 
two small displaced communities in the Alto Naya in Cauca. In order for a community 
in Colombia to become involved with CSN’s sister city project scheme, it  must be 
organised politically, and although these two communities in the Alto Naya are very 
poor, they are quite organised (personal telephone interview with Zarate, December 
1, 2004). Both Cecilia Zarate and Patricia Dahl visited these communities in the 
summer of 2004 and Zarate told me that although the communities were living in very 
poor, materially primitive conditions, the people had organised themselves well. 
According to Zarate, they are looking to the future, building homes for community 
members, creating a food program to provide vegetables for the families there, and
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operating a radio station that unites the community (personal telephone interview  
with Zarate, December 1, 2004).
Although the relationship between the New York chapter and the Alto Naya 
communities has just recently begun, the New York chapter is backing these 
communities politically. Such support is often crucial for small indigenous 
communities in Colombia as it  acts as a kind of protective political shield; the fact 
that an American organisation is supporting these communities is often enough to 
cause the paramilitaries and guerrillas to keep their distance. Dahl says that this kind 
of support is effective because, as she put it, “the forces that oppress them [the 
indigenous communities] now know that we are in daily contact with them, and that 
we know what is happening there, and we will alert the authorities, the press, and the 
general public, if crimes against humanity continue” (personal email correspondence 
with Dahl, January 6, 2005).
To summarize, the roles that CSN plays with the indigenous movement are two­
fold. Networking is the primary role in which the organisation operates, sending 
delegations to Colombia and keeping constant contact between sister cities. Lobbying 
is also a role in which CSN is heavily involved, focusing on letter-writing, email, and 
fax campaigns to the U.S. Congress in order to bring about a change in U.S. policy 
towards Colombia.
Cecilia Zarate related that she perceives the major challenge facing indigenous 
communities and the indigenous movement to be overcoming the threats posed to 
indigenous territories by natural resources interests. Many indigenous territories are 
rich with minerals and crude oil, complicating the movement’s quest for true 
autonomy on indigenous lands and implementation of the ETI legislation. An over­
arching threat is globalization, manifested in the proposed Free Trade Area of the
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Americas (FTAA) agreement (personal telephone interview with Zarate, December 1,
2004). Indeed, September’s huge march in Colombia was also a show of united 
resistance to the FTAA and the perceived threat that the agreement poses to 
peasants, workers, union members, and ethnic minorities. Patricia Dahl, head of 
CSN’s New York City chapter, concurs with Zarate that indigenous communities fear 
corporate control of their land. In an email interview, Dahl wrote to me that foreign 
corporations are increasingly interested in Colombia’s resources, including gold, 
emeralds, coal, oil, coffee, flowers, gas, and water. According to Dahl, indigenous 
communities predict that foreign control over Colombia’s natural resources will force 
local people into deeper poverty. Therefore, the indigenous movement is struggling 
constantly for the right to life, including the constant struggle for land rights and 
cultural sovereignty (personal email correspondence with Dahl, January 6, 2005).
When asked about successes that CSN has seen throughout its 17 years, Zarate 
seemed somewhat discouraged. She is proud of the fact that CSN’s urgent action 
bulletins have saved threatened individuals in Colombia, but acknowledges the fact 
that CSN has a long way to go in its education campaigns; she cites the results of the 
recent U.S. election as an example of why CSN needs to keep working hard (personal 
interview with Zarate, December 1, 2004).
CSN has also experienced some failures in its attempts to set up sister 
communities in Colombia. The NGO had started up a sister community relationship in 
an area of Colombia where there were large projects underway that involved the EU 
and the U.S. government. The sister community relationship ended after three years 
because the communities were not sufficiently organised politically. Zarate has 
learned not to build sister community relationships with communities who have 
already accepted economic development projects through government on their land
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because they are forced to accept the policies of the government. CSN’s policy is to 
work with communities who are mindful of globalization and the environment and who 
have taken these issues into their own hands and begun to organize themselves. 
Working with communities who are receiving money from the government, says 
Zarate, simply will not work (personal telephone interview with Zarate, December 1,
2004). Communities who accept funding from the government equate to tacitly 
supporting government policy, which indigenous organisations like ACIN, CRIC, and 
ONIC believe harm indigenous communities.
En Camino
En Camino, which means ‘on the way’ in Spanish, is a grassroots group based in 
Toronto which provides information and analysis and “space for strategic discussion 
and exchange’’ about war and terrorism around the world (En Camino website June 6,
2005) \  En Camino describes itself as a network of people and organisations from 
around the world which focuses mainly on issues relating to Iraq, Palestine/Israel, and 
Colombia. Broadly, En Camino’s work consists of working towards a political and 
negotiated solution to military conflicts, criticizing the underlying social, economic, 
political models that it argues fuels conflict, and making what it  terms the ‘invisible 
struggles’ (resistance and alternative movements) visible (En Camino website). In 
practice, this work involves giving workshops and interviews, sending out bulletins for 
letter-writing and phone-in campaigns around human rights issues, and developing 
information exchange networks between movements in Canada and abroad. En 
Camino believes “that by offering what we can do and opening up to others, we can 
contribute to a much bigger and more comprehensive e ffort” (En Camino website). En
 ^ Unless otherwise specified, a ll inform ation and quotes contained under the  heading ‘ En
Cam ino’ was obtained from  the En Camino website and verified as accurate as o f June 6, 2005.
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Camino was born after the collapse of an organisation known as the Canada-Colombia 
Solidarity Campaign in 2003 (CCSC) and encompasses many of the same principles of 
CCSC as well as many of the same people (En Camino website).
Manuel Rozental, one of the people at the forefront of En Camino and a former 
member of CCSC, explained that the biggest challenge facing the Nasa people, and the 
indigenous movement broadly (especially in terms of securing indigenous autonomy), 
is corporate interests (personal telephone interview with Rozental, April 12, 2004). 
Like Zarate, Rozental described that En Camino believes social movements and 
indigenous movements are in conflict with capital and corporations, a polarization 
that Rozental believes will become increasingly obvious. Governments are not the 
problem, stated Rozental, rather it is capital that stands in opposition to justice and 
autonomy. For indigenous people, wealth has to be generated, but the purpose of the 
generation of wealth is the protection of life and the attainment of justice and of 
autonomy. With capitalism, the reason to exist is to accumulate, with little  regard for 
justice and the protection of life (personal interview with Rozental, April 12, 2004). 
Justin Podur, also at the forefront of En Camino, explained that the major challenge 
facing the indigenous movement is the fact that the struggle for autonomy is an 
invisible one. Because the indigenous movement opposes the agenda proposed for it 
and for indigenous land by state institutions and capital (manifested in trade 
agreements like the FTAA and corporate interests in general), explained Podur, it  is a 
challenge for the movement to find allies within the state apparatus or internationally 
because it is difficult for the indigenous movement to distinguish itself from the armed 
actors - the guerrillas and the paramilitaries - within the Colombian context. While 
the movement would like to work in solidarity with other autonomous movements like 
the Zapatistas in Mexico and the MST (Landless Peasant Movement) in Brazil, the
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Colombian context makes this difficult; the challenge is convincing international 
organisations and other states that the movement is not affiliated with any of the 
armed actors (personal telephone interview with Podur, March 28, 2004).
En Camino’s mandate takes these challenges and struggles into account and is 
guided by principles that reflect this. Among En Camino’s principles is the strong 
belief that capital is a problem faced globally and that greed and resulting violence go 
hand-in-hand with capital. The solution to the problem of capital, believes En 
Camino, must be found in both the South and the North; instead of doing charity work 
in the South, it may be more effective to stop “aggressive and damaging policies’’ in 
the North that have an impact on people in the South (En Camino website). Such 
policies include foreign policies like Plan Colombia as well as the freedom given to 
multinational corporate interests in the South. Like the other NGOs examined here. 
En Camino supports a negotiated solution to armed conflict (in Colombia and 
elsewhere) but that the negotiating table must include social movements and 
organisations (En Camino website). To these ends. En Camino encourages as many 
people and organisations to endorse a platform based on these principles; a campaign 
that has come to be known as the ‘Minga’ . Explained in Chapter Three, m/nga is a 
Nasa term which refers to the collective effort that occurs when an urgent action is 
required. In the case of En Camino’s Minga, organisations and individuals have come 
together to support the principles mentioned above. What makes the Minga unique is 
that the collective effort revolves around a set of principles and ideas rather than 
joining a particular institution to bring about change (personal interview with 
Rozental, April 12, 2004).
En Camino’s means to implement this platform is to further the construction of 
a web of like-minded social movements and organisations. Rozental explains that this
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network is a weaving of diverse autonomies across the globe so that the whole planet 
becomes like a living organism made of distinct cultures in their own territories, 
offering their own solutions to problems of poverty. Subcommandante Marcos of the 
Zapatista movement (an identifiable member of this informal global network) put it 
simply: “One no, and many yeses”: the different components of the web are united 
around their opposition to capital but are conscious that there are many yeses - many 
alternatives to capitalism - that all have equal validity. In a letter published by the 
French newspaper Le Monde on April 1, 1995, Marcos wrote, “so they talk to us about 
globalization. And we realize that this is what they call this absurd order, where 
there is only one country-the country of money. Where the frontiers will disappear, 
not as a result of brotherhood, but through the haemorrage that fattens the powerful 
who have no nation” (Marcos, cited in Esteva 1997:305).
En Camino operates in two roles with the indigenous movement in Colombia: 
advocacy and networking. Advocacy is the work accomplished through giving 
workshops, interviews, and sending out bulletins about the situation in Colombia. 
Networking is essentially done through the Minga, which facilitate the weaving 
between social movements and brings more organisations and social movements into 
the network. As was mentioned earlier. En Camino is working with the Palestinians in 
Israel, the Zapatistas in Mexico, and the Nasas in Colombia, exchanging information, 
analyses, and knowledge, helping people build contacts and stay in touch with each 
other. Linking these three movements is viewed as the beginning of the web of 
solidarity.
In August 2001, a delegation of around thirty Minga members visited Colombia, 
seven of whom visited the region of Cauca. At this time the Minga was consolidated in 
the CCSC, prior to its collapse and the formation of En Camino. One of the
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participants who visited Cauca was Nicole Schabus, an International Relations lawyer 
with the Shuswap Nation in British Colombia and the Assembly of First Nations. 
Schabus told me, in a phone interview, that the delegation acted as human rights 
observers at a congress entitled “Against the War: Dignity in Resistance”. This was a 
convergence of about 17,000 people representing most of the 84 indigenous nations in 
Colombia as well as their umbrella organisations. Also present were international 
delegations from Europe, the United States, Canada, and other Latin American 
countries (personal telephone interview with Schabus, November 29, 2004). According 
to the report published by the Minga after the delegation’s return, the purpose of this 
congress was to “discuss, address and outline the principles and strategies required to 
take concerted and disciplined action regarding Colombia’s war, its determinants and 
impacts while maintaining the integrity of their cultures and ancestral rights, and, in 
five days, reach consensus on a final declaration” (Cauca Regional Delegation Report 
2001:online). Schabus says she was amazed by the level of organisation demonstrated 
at this congress, how 17,000 people could reach a consensus in such a short tim e­
frame (personal interview with Schabus, November 29, 2004). The Minga report 
explains that everyone was organised into sub-commissions consisting of 50-100 people 
which were led by trained, local facilitators. A guideline for each sub-commission was 
the basis of discussion, which commenced by everyone sharing their personal 
experiences. Eventually each group formulated conclusions and recommendations for 
action which were incorporated into larger commissions and eventually into a plenary 
session. “People came away with an in-depth understanding of the situation and their 
position, and a full commitment to the actions agreed upon. The final declaration was 
a synthetic and comprehensive document outlining their grievances, their plans of 
action, and demands to the government” (Cauca Regional Delegation Report
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2001:online). Having been v^itness to much of the testimony and videotapes shown at 
the congress, Schabus said she was very inspired by the process, saying that the 
Colombian indigenous movement was the most organised indigenous movement she 
has ever seen (personal telephone interview with Schabus, November 29, 2004).
Part Two: Analvsis of NGO Programs and Prescriptions for Future NGO Roles
The descriptions of these four NGOs highlights some obvious similarities and 
differences between them. By analyzing these discrepancies it becomes possible to 
group these NGOs into two categories; Inter Pares and Rights and Democracy fall into 
one category of NGO whereas Colombia Support Network and En Camino fall under a 
second. Despite the fact that these four case study NGOs represent a variety of 
different organizational types - a charity (Inter Pares), solidarity movement (En 
Camino, CSN), and a quasi-governmental organization (Rights and Democracy) - it is 
more important to focus on Chapter One's NGO definition rather than how these 
groups self-identify. Recalling the definition of an NGO set forth in Chapter One - a 
not-for-profit, autonomous, non market-oriented organisation that exists in order to 
benefit the poor and underprivileged members of a population - it is clear that all four 
organisations are NGOs. However, they act in many different capacities, fulfilling a 
variety of roles. Recognizing this, I still believe that Chapter One's NGO definition is a 
useful one. It excludes businesses and those organizations that exist to make a profit 
and it excludes those organizations that are a function of government. Essentially, 
this definition encompasses those organizations that epitomize the characteristics of 
the term NGO'. That the term happens to include such a variety of NGOs is an 
interesting find that serves to highlight the diversity of NGOs that exist and reinforces 
Chapter One's discussion surrounding the difficulties of truly defining the term NGO'.
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Both Chapter One as well as the interviews conducted for this thesis 
emphasized the difficulties with defining the term 'NGO'. Although defining oneself is 
is based both on self-perception and the perception of others, I feel it is necessary to 
highlight the fact that none of the NGO representatives interviewed disputed his/her 
organization being referred to as an NGO'. Recognizing that self-identification is 
important, this thesis was guided overall by the definition set forth in Chapter One. 
An important discovery that will be mentioned throughout this chapter was that while 
all of these NGOs initially fit within the confines of Chapter One's NGO definition, 
upon closer examination, the NGOs themselves may not necessarily link their 
organization with every facet of this definition. A deeper discussion of self-identity is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, but will be briefly discussed in this section.
This section will summarize the activities and programs initiated by each case 
study NGO and place them into the NGO role framework established in Chapter One. 
In order to best understand the categorizations, Korten’s voluntary development 
action model, also explained in Chapter One, will be used.
To begin. Inter Pares and Rights and Democracy should be placed in the same 
category as they both play similar roles with Colombia’s indigenous movement and fit 
somewhere between Korten’s Generation Two and Generation Three categories. The 
Generation Two quality most apparently demonstrated by these two NGOs is the 
capacity-building role they played by acting as mobilizers: providing loans, education, 
and training, to help communities realize their potential. The Generation Three 
qualities most prevalent within Inter Pares and Rights and Democracy include their 
recognition that structural problems in the world system are the cause of local 
inequalities and their work with other organisations and government to build peoples' 
organisational capacities. While both NGOs demonstrate a combination of Generation
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Two and Generation Three qualities, Rights and Democracy is much more firmly rooted 
in a Generation Three framework than is Inter Pares in the scope of its projects. 
Rights and Democracy focused on the entire continent of Latin America in an effort to 
unite indigenous women and increase their profile and influence within ONIC and 
during the mission to Colombia in 2001 sought to promote awareness of the situation 
of indigenous peoples in Colombia and Canada, activities which fall under the roles of 
capacity-building and advocacy, respectively. Inter Pares, in its program with PCS, did 
focus on the region of Chocô (rather than a specific community or village, a 
Generation Three tra it) but the program was designed to increase negotiation 
capabilities within ONIC, a capacity-building program not lofty enough to be 
considered Generation Three. Outside of Korten’s framework, similarities between 
these two NGOs include being financed largely by the Canadian government (a concern 
I w ill address shortly), using this financing to support local initiatives in developing 
countries, and partnering with other organisations to form networks of advocacy. 
Both organisations have operated in capacity-building roles within the Colombian 
indigenous movement.
Colombia Support Network and En Camino differ from Rights and Democracy 
and Inter Pares in that the former two NGOs fit into Korten’s Generation Four NGO 
category. Therefore, I group CSN and En Camino in together, apart from Rights and 
Democracy and Inter Pares. A Generation Four NGO is one that is involved with 
“movement facilitation as a major program strategy” (Korten 1990:131) and which 
“coalesce[s] and energize[s] self-managing networks over which [the NGO] has no 
control whatever. This must be achieved primarily through the power of ideas, values 
and communication links” (Korten 1990:127). The similarities between En Camino and 
CSN are numerous and include lack of reliance on a solid funding base (neither are
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funded by government), working towards a negotiated solution to the conflict in 
Colombia, creating reciprocal relationships with partner individuals and groups, and 
criticizing the policies of both the Colombian government and their own respective 
national governments. En Camino is striving to form lasting and strong links between 
marginalized peoples around the world, while CSN is attempting to build a nation-wide 
movement in the United States that would pose an effective opposition to U.S. 
(foreign) policy in Colombia. These operations fit under the ‘networking and 
strengthening civil society’ role laid out in Chapter One. Both NGOs are, therefore. 
Generation Four organisations with respect to their long-term commitment to their 
projects and in their determination to build a wider movement out of the relationships 
established in their project work.
In Chapter One I identified criticisms of NGOs and obstacles to NGO 
effectiveness articulated by writers working in the NGO field. These criticisms are 
relevant as I examine how effective these four NGOs have been within the Colombian 
indigenous movement. While all four NGOs have struggled with failures and problems 
with their respective programs, it is Rights and Democracy and Inter Pares to whom 
these criticisms for the most part apply.
To explain, first is the general issue of funding, lion (1998), Mohan (2002), 
Fowler (2000), and Grugel (2003) all point out the difficulties faced by NGOs who get 
most or all of their funding from a government source or from any single influential 
donor. Among the challenges faced by such NGOs are how to resist conforming to the 
values and goals of donors or government, how to retain moral autonomy and thus 
credibility in the communities with which the NGO is working, and how to avoid 
becoming embedded within government networks. Inter Pares states on its website 
that it  receives funding from the Canadian International Development Agency and that
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it routinely participates in government committees and produces policy papers and 
presentations for government agencies. Rights and Democracy was formed by 
Canada's Parliament, is financed almost entirely by Canada's Overseas Development 
Assistance Budget, and is accountable to the Auditor General. While it is difficult to 
discern whether these realities have had any noticeable or measurable impact upon 
programs run by these two NGOs, Bruer suggested that Inter Pares has experienced 
difficulties in developing programs or receiving funds for programs that do not 
conform to Canadian government policy. By working through another group, the 
Project Counseling Service, such conflicts were circumvented in the case of Inter 
Pares’ work with Colombian indigenous communities.
Rights and Democracy has also experienced difficulties due to its funding 
sources in the case of its joint mission to Cauca. Nicole Schabus of En Camino 
reported in her interview that the Minga trip to Cauca occurred shortly after Rights 
and Democracy’s joint mission to the region. As a result, she said, her and her group 
were faced with apprehension from indigenous groups who had already been visited by 
the Rights and Democracy delegation. Apparently, indigenous communities were 
aware that the Rights and Democracy mission was endorsed by the Canadian 
government and believed that the delegation had come to the region to promote the 
Canadian petroleum industry (personal interview with Schabus, November 29, 2004). 
Although there is no reference to the petroleum industry in the report that was 
released after the Rights and Democracy mission, it is worrisome that the indigenous 
communities would display such unease toward a delegation endorsed by Canada and 
represented by the Canadian government. It is possible that indigenous communities 
in Cauca perceive Rights and Democracy to be acting, in the words of Fowler (2000), 
“as conspirators rather than partners”, intending to further Canadian interests in
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Colombia rather than support indigenous communities. This experience with the 
Rights and Democracy mission raises another criticism discussed in Chapter One; that 
NGOs are not accountable to local people but instead to overseas donors (Petras 
1997). While there is no available evidence that indigenous communities in Colombia 
distrust Inter Pares for this reason, Rights and Democracy does seem to be facing this 
credibility issue with indigenous communities. Can NGOs be effective if  they lack 
the confidence of local grassroots groups? While it  is not within the scope of this 
project to answer this question, it appears that neither En Camino nor CSN struggle 
with these issues, nor is either funded by government. Instead, these latter two 
organisations are accountable to individual donors, the organisation's membership 
base, as well as to those communities with which they work. This gives En Camino and 
CSN a degree of flexibility that Rights and Democracy and Inter Pares do not have, 
allowing the former two NGOs to adapt their programs according to changing realities 
and needs at the grassroots.
Additional criticisms introduced in Chapter One include the observations that 
NGO projects are rarely long-term, that the changes made in the course of a project 
may only last as long as the project itself, that it  is hard for an NGO to secure funding 
to operate in an advocacy capacity, and that it is challenging to translate “local-level 
successes into larger scale social change” (Keese 2000:7). Sundberg, in a study of 
conservation NGOs in Guatemala, writes that indigenous communities who wish to 
earn the support of NGOs must “enact helplessness and create the space for the NGO 
to provide help” (2004:51). Indigenous communities must be “attractive” and 
“compatible” to potential NGO funders (Sundberg 2004:41). This kind of discourse 
reinforces the perception that indigenous communities are helpless and incapable of 
guiding their own development and reliant upon Northern NGOs for aid.
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In light of these many criticisms and the dubious effectiveness of the 
Colombian programming funded by Rights and Democracy and Inter Pares, I wanted to 
find out what roles (if any) the NGO representatives feel that North American NGOs 
can best fulfill with the Colombian indigenous movement. This question was asked of 
each NGO representative and expert in the field in a personal interview, with mixed 
responses. Almost every respondent, including Cecilia Zarate (founder of CSN), David 
Bruer (Inter Pares), anonymous (Rights and Democracy), Betsy Marsh (former Program 
Coordinator with the NGO Amazon Alliance, now an independent consultant), and 
Patricia Dahl (head of CSN’s New York chapter), believed that North American NGOs 
could have a role to play in the indigenous movement but that this role should be 
limited to advocacy and lobbying. These respondents suggested that the most 
effective role was to lobby governments directly, both in North America and in 
Colombia, in order to protect indigenous rights and change government policy in and 
towards Colombia. North American NGOs could also work to raise the profile of the 
indigenous movement in the media and conduct educational outreach programs to 
publicize the issue. Patricia Dahl saw a role for NGOs in human rights and security 
accompaniment activities (personal email correspondence with Dahl, January 6, 2005) 
while David Bruer, differing from the other respondents, pointed out that emergency 
relief efforts are needed in the area (personal telephone interview with Bruer, 
November 11, 2004). Interestingly, only Bruer and Marsh mentioned that northern 
NGOs could play the role of capacity-builder in the movement (personal telephone 
interview with Bruer, November 11, 2004; personal interview with Marsh, December 9,
2004).
Justin Podur (En Camino) and Nicole Schabus (En Camino) were both opposed 
to the idea that North American NGOs could be involved with the indigenous
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movement in any capacity. Podur’s opposition relates to the funding issue, mentioned 
earlier. Because so many NGOs are funded by government, Podur is wary of whose 
agenda a given NGO might be pushing within the movement; i.e ., is the NGO acting in 
the best interests of the movement and indigenous communities or in the best 
interests of the government funding that NGO? Podur also explained that since the 
movement has built itself from the ground up with no outside help thus far, he 
believes that it does not need the assistance of North American NGOs at this point. 
Although it may seem as though Podur is contradicting himself by stating that there is 
no role for North American NGOs while working for a North American NGO that aims to 
assist the movement, Podur does not see En Camino as an NGO but rather more as a 
collective or solidarity group (personal email correspondence with Podur, May 25,
2005). However, recognizing that the situation may worsen for indigenous 
communities in Colombia, Podur added that international support and solidarity from 
North American NGOs may become necessary one day for the indigenous movement to 
survive (personal telephone interview with Podur, March 28, 2004).
Nicole Schabus was much more firm in her opposition to northern NGOs’ 
involvement. Schabus’ criticism is related to that of academic Mary Kaldor, 
mentioned in Chapter One. Kaldor observed that government-funded NGOs have a 
propensity to overtake grassroots organisations, causing local values to be 
overshadowed (Kaldor 2003:92-93). Supporting Kaldor’s observation, Schabus 
explained that CIDA-funded NGOs have caused indigenous organisations in Canada to 
be put out of work. Because of this, remarked Schabus, indigenous people in 
Colombia wish to work with indigenous leadership and peoples in Canada directly, not 
through NGOs. In response to the suggestion that North American NGOs may be of use 
in building international solidarity with the indigenous people of Colombia, Schabus
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thought this possible only if  the attitude was one of learning and sharing and not a 
patronizing, ‘we are here to help you’ position (personal telephone interview with 
Schabus, November 29, 2004). It is important to note that Schabus, as a lawyer 
working with the Shuswap nation, is operating from an indigenous perspective, as a 
liaison between First Nations communities in Canada and indigenous groups in 
Colombia in order to strengthen relationships of solidarity. Like Podur, Schabus does 
not see En Camino is as an institutionalized NGO but rather a solidarity organisation, 
an outlet through which to build these meaningful relationships.
As was mentioned at the beginning of this section, how these organizations 
identify themselves is important. The two NGOs Inter Pares and Rights and Democracy 
have much more to be gained by calling themselves NGOs than does CSN or En Camino. 
If the former two NGOs adopted an identity that incorporated the fact that they 
receive government funding, it is possible that they would lose the support of 
individual donors who have no interest in participating in a quasi-governmental 
organization. As was suggested by Fowler (2000:641) in Chapter One, a truly non­
governmental NGO possesses more moral authority at the grassroots than does an NGO 
with government ties. In the case of En Camino, an organization which does not 
receive government funding, its representatives were much more wary of identifying 
En Camino with the term NGO' under which so many organizations can fall. As a 
result, Podur and Schabus specified that En Camino is a solidarity organization, 
thereby distancing the organization from the broad and variable term NGO'.
To return to the original thesis question, in what roles, should NGOs operate 
with the Colombian indigenous movement? My conclusion, based on these interviews 
and the criticisms of NGOs in general, is that North American NGOs have the capacity 
to play three roles within the indigenous movement in Colombia, detailed below.
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NGOs working In these roles have the capacity to align with the indigenous movement 
and further the movement’s collective goals. Reviewing from Chapter Three, these 
goals can be divided into four groups. First, indigenous communities strive for the 
implementation of indigenous-directed development programs. Such programs include 
bilingual and bicultural education programs, programs directed at youth and children 
and towards the strengthening and participation of women, agricultural development, 
the development of a strong indigenous justice system, and health and education 
programs which reflect indigenous values and knowledge. A second subset of goals of 
the indigenous movement are to defend against threats to indigenous autonomy, 
traditions, language, and culture and prevent the exploitation of natural resources 
found on indigenous lands. This can be done specifically through strengthening the 
cabildos and struggling to implement the articles in the 1991 Constitution that support 
indigenous rights. A third category of goals include fighting against the Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FTAA), a bilateral free trade agreement between Colombia and 
the U.S., and Uribe’s proposed reforms to the Constitution. This third category 
requires yet another goal of the movement to come into play: solidarity with other 
social actors. That this last goal is being actively pursued is made clear by the 
example of the September march, which included peasants, farmers, Afro-Colombians, 
and unionists. Within the context of these four categories of goals, I believe that 
NGOs can operate within three roles, as indeed the four case study NGOs have shown.
(1) Research and Advocacy
As was mentioned in Chapter One, research and advocacy tend to go hand-in- 
hand: an NGO advocates creation of or change in a certain policy based on evidence 
gained from research. In the context of Colombia, the role of research and advocacy 
is one that can be quite varied. For instance, an NGO could advocate that the
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Colombian government respect indigenous rights, an end to the violence in the 
country through a negotiated solution, cessation of U.S. funding to Colombia, or for 
the Colombian government to implement articles in the 1991 Constitution. To these 
ends. En Camino, Rights and Democracy, and CSN have been the most active. CSN and 
En Camino are strong and outspoken opponents of the Plan Colombia and all three 
NGOs advocate a negotiated solution to the conflict in Colombia. In terms of research, 
Rights and Democracy released a report follov/ing the 2001 mission to Colombia, which 
contained a comprehensive guide to the situation of indigenous peoples in the 
country. CSN and En Camino maintain their websites regularly, featuring frequent 
updates about the situation of indigenous (and non-indigenous) marginalized peoples 
in the country. All three NGOs post urgent action bulletins on their websites. Inter 
Pares also does a good deal of research on various pressing and pertinent topics 
related to international development, however, to date only one document on Inter 
Pares’ website concerns Colombia, a photo essay on confined communities (those 
communities that are surrounded and controlled by an armed group, preventing 
members from leaving).
Of the many issues around which NGOs can research and advocate, I believe 
that NGOs could work most effectively, first and foremost, by seeking to change U.S. 
policy towards Colombia. Specifically, NGOs should concentrate on ending U.S. 
military funding to the region and advocate for funding for alternative development 
projects such as voluntary coca eradication schemes. Since the situation in Colombia 
is not widely discussed in North America, few people are aware of the huge amount of 
funding that the U.S. gives to Colombia’s military through Plan Colombia and how as a 
result the U.S. government so directly contributes to the violence and volatility in the 
country. NGOs should work to educate the broader public on these issues and
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advocate for related policy change. Adopting a research and advocacy role that 
concentrates on military spending through Plan Colombia is fundamentally important 
to the indigenous movement as many of its goals depend on the cessation of violence 
in Colombia. For example, a respite from violence in indigenous communities would 
open a space for the implementation of the numerous development programs outlined 
above.
(2) Lobbying
Lobbying, as was explained in Chapter One, differs from advocacy as it exerts 
pressure on governments, international bodies, and media directly. As with advocacy, 
NGOs lobby government, media, and international bodies in a variety of contexts. 
NGOs based in North America, especially American NGOs, should concentrate on 
lobbying the U.S. and Colombian governments for policy change. Specifically, NGOs 
should push the U.S. to reassess its role in Colombia and to consider the outcome of its 
massive military spending in the country. Since the U.S. so heavily funds Colombia, 
American NGOs have some credibility when they demand that the Colombian 
government uphold human rights standards and respect indigenous rights as laid out in 
the 1991 Colombian Constitution. Lobbying also garners media attention which in turn 
has the potential to bring about increased public awareness surrounding the U.S.’s 
role in Colombia and the situation of indigenous people there; heightening the status 
of the issue in public discourse will serve to boost NGOs’ lobbying capacity. CSN is the 
only NGO of the four case study NGOs to engage in lobbying activities in the case of 
Colombia, indeed it  is an integral part of CSN’s work. A statement on CSN’s website 
illustrates how crucial lobbying work is for this NGO:
CSN chapters participating in the sister cities program organize events
to make their representatives in Congress aware of what is happening in
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Colombia and how US government policy has an effect on events in the 
Colombian sister community. The sister community relationship 
provides a concrete example of the effects of US policies, such as 
support for the military and police in Colombia or chemical spraying of 
drug crops there. And Senators and Representatives who hear of the 
negative effects of US policies upon Colombian peasants and 
townspeople from their own constituents in the US sister community are 
much more likely to react to change those policies than they would be 
without such direct pressure (CSN website).
In this case, lobbying brings the issues closer to home and has an impact on those who 
have the power to change harmful policies. In the case of the indigenous movement, 
lobbying activities by NGOs could help to further similar goals as advocacy: changing 
U.S. policy towards Colombia, thereby reducing violence in the country and opening 
spaces for development of indigenous programs, as described above.
(3) Building Networks of Solidarity
In Chapter One I briefly outlined the role of networking and strengthening civil 
society and how NGOs playing this role facilitate co-operation, communication, and 
coordination between social movements and other organisations. Building networks of 
solidarity is arguably the most important role that an NGO can play within the 
indigenous movement in the long-term. If the work of En Camino and CSN are any 
indication, a relationship of solidarity with indigenous communities in Colombia is 
long-term, reciprocal, and not reliant upon funding. En Camino’s Minga project, while 
started through the Canada-Colombia Solidarity Campaign in 2000, continues to be 
strong today. Colombia Support Network has existed for around 16 years and is 
developing new relationships between its chapters and Colombian communities. A 
key to these relationships is that neither CSN nor En Camino dictates how its partner 
communities in Colombia should operate or design their projects. These are 
relationships of learning and knowledge-sharing and intended to be reciprocal; the
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organisations involved recognize that they have as much to teach as they have to 
learn.
There are several reasons why I believe this third role to be the most 
important. Of course the sustainability and reciprocal nature of the relationships built 
are key, but another reason is the self-strengthening and regenerating quality of a 
solidarity network. As Rozental from En Camino put it, individuals and organisations 
join a platform, not an organisation. Those affiliated with the Minga recognize the 
urgency with which they must act in order to halt the violence in Colombia (personal 
telephone interview with Rozental, April 12, 2004). By posting analyses of the 
situation in Colombia on En Camino’s website, anyone with access to the internet can 
learn about the situation of indigenous peoples in Colombia and about the struggles of 
marginalized people in other countries as well. By visiting En Camino’s website, a 
person can strengthen his/her understanding of the situation in Colombia and pass this 
information onto others. Simple awareness of struggles such as the one being fought 
by Colombian indigenous people strengthens the solidarity network.
Activities like knowledge-sharing, political analyses, and strengthening of 
relationships between organisations, all of which occur across borders, constitute 
what Thomas Olesen (2004) calls ‘global solidarity’ . Although Olesen discusses this 
term in relation to the Zapatista indigenous movement in Chiapas, Mexico, it is a 
highly relevant term in the context of the indigenous movement in Colombia. Olesen 
writes that global solidarity “is a form of solidarity that emphasizes similarities 
between physically, socially, and culturally distant people, while at the same time 
respecting and acknowledging local and national differences’’ (Olesen 2004:259). 
Global solidarity is a reciprocal relationship which “blurs the distinction between 
providers and beneficiaries” (Oleson 2004:258) and “is an expression of a more
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extensive global consciousness that constructs the grievances of physically, socially, 
and culturally distant people as deeply intertwined” (Oleson 2004:259). Applying this 
concept of ‘global solidarity’ to the present case study, the grievances of the 
indigenous movement in Colombia are free trade, manifested in the FTAA and 
proposed bilateral agreements between the U.S. and Colombia, and violence in 
indigenous territories and in the rest of Colombia. These are grievances that are not 
only shared by other social movements in Latin America (e.g. in Bolivia and Ecuador) 
but are fe lt around the world. If strong enough, networks of solidarity formed 
between marginalized people and a mélange of NGOs around the world could pose an 
effective opposition to these threats. En Camino has already initiated a small-scale 
version of such a network by providing analyses and first-hand accounts of the 
situation of the Zapatistas in Mexico, the Palestinians in the West Bank and Israel, and 
of course, the indigenous movement in Colombia. On an even smaller scale, CSN has 
built solidarity networks between communities in the U.S. and in Colombia. But 
according to Cecilia Zarate, this small amount of political support that CSN provides to 
threatened communities in Colombia is working and has prevented violence in those 
communities (personal telephone interview with Zarate, December 1, 2004).
Within the role of building networks of solidarity is the aspect of human rights 
protection. As was mentioned in the case of CSN and its indigenous sister 
communities, the presence of an international organization can have a positive effect 
on the human rights. Peace Brigades International is one organization that works 
around the idea of protective accompaniment, a concept which “rests on the idea that 
the presence of unarmed international escorts alongside local activists can deter 
attacks. Violence and threats directed at foreign nationals, or those they are 
escorting, often result in higher political costs for the transgressors than the same
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actions directed at unaccompanied local citizens” (Coy 1997:81-2). En Camino has 
also been involved with accompaniment activities in Colombia; Schabus remarked that 
one of the reasons for the Minga trip to Colombia was to provide protection to the 
large indigenous congress taking place at the time. Rights and Democracy has also 
played a human rights protection role, although to a lesser degree than En Camino and 
CSN, through sending urgent action bulletins regarding serious threats to human rights. 
Because none of the case study NGOs were engaged deeply in human rights 
accompaniment, this thesis does not explore the role in depth. However, it  is a role 
that could be the focus of future studies on the relationship between NGOs and the 
Colombian indigenous movement.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the roles and relationships of four North American 
NGOs in the context of the indigenous movement in Colombia. By reviewing 
interviews held with representatives from each NGO, I have uncovered successes and 
failures of NGO work with the movement. This information was used to group the four 
NGOs into two categories: Inter Pares and Rights and Democracy in one. En Camino 
and Colombia Support Network in the other. This categorization was appropriate as 
those NGOs in group one received government funding, operated overall in a capacity- 
building role, and could be characterized as a mixture of Korten’s Generation Two and 
Generation Three categories. Those NGOs in the second group, however, closely fit 
Korten’s Generation Four NGO category, focusing on building a wider movement based 
upon the linkages made between indigenous communities in Colombia and concerned 
groups and individuals in North America. These analyses have led me to conclude that 
there are three roles that NGOs should play within the indigenous movement in
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Colombia: research and advocacy, lobbying, and building networks of solidarity. The 
goals of the Colombian indigenous movement are ambitious. They include developing 
a variety of indigenous community programs, defending indigenous autonomy, culture, 
protecting natural resources on indigenous lands, fighting free trade, and ending 
violence in indigenous communities. NGOs based in North America are best suited to 
helping the indigenous movement come closer to achieving the latter two goals. 
Through advocacy, research, and lobbying campaigns at home in Canada and the U.S., 
NGOs may be able to create the space necessary for the other goals to be achieved. 
Building networks of solidarity is a long-term strategy that could broaden public 
awareness of the situation of marginalized peoples in Colombia and elsewhere, 
centred around a common struggle against global threats like free trade, 
environmental degradation and violation of human rights.
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Conclusion
The motivation for writing a thesis on this topic comes from my deep interest 
in how Colombian social movements mobilize in the midst of such intense violence and 
from my curiosity as to what relationships North American NGOs have with such 
struggles. Through this research I ultimately hope to provide a partial answer to the 
question of how to effect meaningful change and ameliorate the situation of 
indigenous peoples in Colombia. In the course of attending public political 
demonstrations surrounding a number of so-called “anti-globalization” issues, one 
often hears the refrain, “another world is possible”, a mantra which underscores the 
belief that the state of affairs of the world can be improved. If civil society with its 
many actors is to be the vehicle for such change (as participants at such protests are 
wont to believe), then it is important to understand how NGOs and social movements 
interact, since both are active components of civil society. However, there is very 
little  to be found on this subject in current academic literature. This thesis, 
concerning the roles that NGOs based in North America have and should play within 
the Colombian indigenous movement, is intended to be a small piece in this puzzle.
Summary of Chapters
The main thesis question was broken into two parts: what roles have North 
American NGOs played with the Colombian indigenous movement and what roles 
should these NGOs play in future? These questions were answered in the course of 
four chapters. Chapter One settled on a definition of ‘NGO’ as appropriate for this 
thesis - ‘not-for-profit, autonomous, not market-oriented organisations that exist in 
order to benefit the poor and underprivileged members of a population’ - and 
determined that the term ‘NGO’ in this thesis would include only Canadian and
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American development NGOs. As v a^s mentioned in the introductory chapter, North 
American NGOs were chosen as a case study because of their proximity to Colombia 
and their presumably more intimate relationship with the indigenous movement than 
European NGOs. Chapter One also discussed the different roles that NGOs play in 
general and included a large section addressing obstacles to fulfilling these roles as 
well as fundamental NGO critiques found in the literature.
Chapter Two dealt with the issue of social movements and reviewed literature 
about what social movements are, how they form, and how they grow. Chapter Two 
adopted Colas’ definition of a social movement: “a sustained and purposeful collective 
mobilization by an identifiable, self-organised group in confrontation with specific 
power structures, and in pursuit of socio-economic change” (Colas 2002:67). Chapters 
One and Two built a framework within which to situate the remaining two chapters.
Chapter Three provided an overview of the political situation in Colombia, 
including the major actors in the violent civil conflict and a brief explanation of Plan 
Colombia. These first few sections provided the proper context within which to 
analyze the indigenous movement in Colombia. The second half of Chapter Three 
described the different factions that comprise the movement and, based upon analysis 
in Chapter Two, explains why this collection of indigenous groups can be called a 
'social movement’ .
Finally, Chapter Four looked at four North American NGOs that work with the 
indigenous movement in Colombia: Inter Pares, Rights and Democracy, Colombia 
Support Network, and En Camino. For each NGO, I investigated the underlying 
philosophy and principles, programs both underway and concluded with the indigenous 
movement, and successes and failures of these programs, in order to answer the 
question of what roles North American NGOs have played with the Colombian
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indigenous movement. An analysis of this information began v^ith the grouping of the 
NGOs into two categories: Rights and Democracy and Inter Pares in one, En Camino 
and Colombia Support Network in the other, based on Korten’s (1990) voluntary 
development action model from Chapter One. Finally, in order to answer the question 
of what roles North American NGOs should play with the Colombian indigenous 
movement, I proposed three principal roles for these NGOs: research and advocacy, 
lobbying, and building networks of solidarity, based upon the analyses of the work 
done by the four North American NGOs investigated in the first half of Chapter Four. 
All three roles were conceptualized with the intention of moving away from 
‘traditional’ NGO work such as welfare and relief. While such emergency-response 
roles are important in situations such as environmental catastrophe and refugee 
crises, these are insufficient roles for NGOs to play within social movements. By their 
nature, social movements are sustained and purposeful, able to mobilize members, 
and concerned with effecting social and political change. NGOs who become involved 
with social movements must exhibit a similar orientation and pursue similar goals. 
Research and advocacy and lobbying are two interlinked roles which can be used to 
leverage a shift in U.S. government policy towards Colombia, crucial, if  the situation 
of indigenous peoples in Colombia is to be ameliorated. Building networks of 
solidarity, identified in Chapter Four as being a crucial role for North American NGOs, 
would engage those unfamiliar with the situation in Colombia, garner support for the 
cause, and heighten awareness of the situation of other marginalized peoples in the 
world, thereby contributing to a global solidarity network.
Conceptual and Practical Challenges
In the course of writing this thesis, several conceptual issues arose. First was
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the problem of how to properly define an NGO. More specifically, what exactly does 
the term ‘nongovernmental’ imply? Rights and Democracy and Inter Pares were both 
included in this study, however, as was noted in Chapter Four, both NGOs receive 
government funding. Can an organisation that receives government funding truly be 
considered ‘nongovernmental’? In this thesis it has been argued that yes, it can be, as 
long as the organisation remains autonomous: not an arm or branch of government. 
However, the opposite could easily be argued, and indeed has, but the issue here is 
not the source of funding, but rather the effectiveness with which the organisation 
works with those funds, and the constraints and conditions under which the funding is 
accepted. Similarly, it was discovered upon closer examination of these groups that 
while all four of the case study organizations are NGOs (as defined in Chapter One), 
they vary greatly within the NGO definition. Inter Pares and Rights and Democracy are 
reliant upon government funding to carry out their activities and En Camino and CSN 
identify themselves as being solidarity organizations rather than NGOs. While this find 
is important, this thesis was guided by the literature review undertaken in Chapter 
One and therefore includes all four organizations under the heading of NGO'.
In outlining three roles that NGOs should play within the Colombian indigenous 
movement, I assume that all four of my case study NGOs can operate with freedom in 
those roles. However, it  must be acknowledged that lobbying in particular may be 
difficult for those NGOs that receive government funding, since directly and 
consistently challenging government policy could have consequences for future 
funding by that government.
A significant problem lies in the study of the Colombian indigenous movement, 
given that the movement is composed of a number of various sub-groups, which are 
not officially defined. However, this is an inherent problem in studying social
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movements in general, as fev/ are monolithic in nature or concretely organised. In 
this case, two of the most active and organised regional indigenous organisations in 
Colombia were studied, as well as the national indigenous organisation which 
embodies most of the regional indigenous organisations, ONIC. It must be noted as 
well that Colombia is comprised of 32 administrative departments, each of which has 
its own resguardos and indigenous cabildos and all of which are organised politically to 
varying degrees. As in Cauca with CRIC and ACIN, most of the cabildos within these 
departments have organised into regional indigenous organisations themselves. 
However, this thesis represents only a specific case study, incorporating just three 
indigenous organisations, and it is beyond its scope to examine every sub-organisation 
that is part of the movement. To study the linkages between these different 
organisations and their relationships with North American NGOs represents a rich 
opportunity for future research.
The four case study organizations examined here represent a wide variety of 
NGOs that exist in North America. Despite their diversity, all fell within the 
constraints of the NGO definition set out in Chapter One. While it might be argued 
that the usefulness of this study could have been enhanced had it focused exclusively 
on more traditional NGOs or exclusively on solidarity movements, I believe it is both 
important and useful to compare the programs run by these different types of NGOs. 
By comparing and contrasting their work, it is possible to reveal more dramatically the 
successes and failures experienced by these NGOs and therefore this study is much 
more representative of the work that North American NGOs actually do with the 
Colombian indigenous movement.
Finally, it  should be noted that this research is not based on any fieldwork 
done in Colombia or on any interviews with representatives from the Colombian
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indigenous movement itself. While research like this would of course have added 
depth to this thesis, this study only ever intended to investigate NGO roles with the 
movement by looking at programs run by these NGOs. While interviews with 
Colombian indigenous movement members would have been interesting, they are 
unnecessary to understand the activities of each NGO and the successes and failures of 
these programs.
Implications of Research and Opportunities for Further Study
Upon starting this project I was of the frame of mind that NGOs were the most 
effective vehicle of development and that by working with social movements their 
effectiveness could only be heightened. In the course of researching NGOs and 
interviewing their staff, I have become somewhat disillusioned by the work of NGOs. 
This disillusionment stems from the critiques and obstacles to NGO effectiveness, 
explained in Chapter One, as well as from the primary analysis of the two more 
institutionalized NGOs in the case study. Inter Pares and Rights and Democracy. As 
was evident in the Chapter Four analysis, there is a huge division between the two 
NGOs Rights and Democracy and Inter Pares, and CSN and En Camino. This 
unexpected find caused me to incorporate Korten's NGO voluntary development action 
model more deeply into Chapter Four. Korten developed this to reflect the 
evolutionary trend among NGOs as they move away from more traditional relief 
activities (Korten 1990:15). Inter Pares and Rights and Democracy fit  somewhere in 
the middle of Korten’s scale, sharing characteristics of both Generation Two and 
Generation Three NGOs. CSN and En Camino were much more distinct in their 
categorization, matching Korten’s Generation Four qualities. The separation between 
the two groups became more obvious as I analyzed the programs and principal goals of
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the organisations. However it is important to point out that this distinction only 
necessarily applies in the case of the work these NGOs do with Colombia and it is 
entirely possible that Rights and Democracy or Inter Pares work in a Generation Four 
capacity in other contexts. Regardless, it was this division that caused me to question 
the overall effectiveness of the institutionalized NGOs and be more highly critical of 
Rights and Democracy and Inter Pares in the analysis section, given that Rights and 
Democracy has no long-term or short-term projects or goals with the Colombian 
indigenous movement despite the 2001 mission, and Inter Pares’ project with the 
movement ended prematurely.
Three roles - research and advocacy, lobbying, and networking - were proposed 
in Chapter Four as those that North American NGOs should play with the Colombian 
indigenous movement if  they are to have a constructive effect. Networking was 
emphasized as being the most important of the three, because of the potential for this 
role to strengthen relationships between social movements and NGOs situated in 
different countries. In the present case. North American NGOs must ensure that 
relationships with indigenous counterparts do not emphasize power dynamics nor 
reinforce neocolonial attitudes. Writing on her experiences in Guatemala, Sundberg 
reflects that histories of racism in Latin America make it difficult for Northern NGOs to 
work with indigenous peoples in the South. These relationships encourage indigenous 
communities “to enact discourses of humility, helplessness, tradition, and 
authenticity” (Sundberg 2004:51-2). Based upon the information on each NGOs 
website and upon interviews conducted with NGO representatives, I do not believe 
that any of the four NGOs studied in this thesis are creating or operating in such a 
relationship. Inter Pares and Rights and Democracy use language such as “equal 
partners” and “mutual respect” when discussing communities with whom they work.
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CSN and En Camino are explicitly solidarity groups, implying that they are working as 
equals with their counterparts. Because of the history of colonialism in Latin 
America, power is always an issue when a North American NGO attempts to work with 
indigenous communities in the South. However, the language used by these four case 
study NGOs demonstrates that these NGOs are aware of the power dynamics created 
as a result of colonialism and are actively working to avoid becoming embedded within 
a neocolonial relationship.
Despite this inherent risk, networking is a role that carries much potential in 
bringing about awareness of the struggles of social movements. Yet it is a role that is 
under-explored in both NGO and social movement literature. The potential impact of 
bolstering this role in any social movement/NGO collaboration is enormous. Within 
the present case of the Colombian indigenous movement, Colombian NGOs would gain 
knowledge and valuable resources from networking with NGOs based in the North. 
The indigenous movement gains from having the profile of its struggle heightened in 
public discourse in the North. However, the success of a networking role cannot be 
taken for granted and hinges upon Northern NGOs working cooperatively and humbly 
with their Southern partners. A possibility for further study and research lies in 
studying the effectiveness of Northern NGOs that engage heavily in networking. 
Investigating the credibility that such NGOs hold at the grassroots would be 
worthwhile in order to discover whether they are operating within truly reciprocal, 
equal relationships.
In recognition that Rights and Democracy and Inter Pares enjoy a more secure 
funding base than do En Camino and CSN, 1 posit a fourth role for NGOs within the 
Colombian indigenous movement, that of ‘funding’ . While a funding role pertains 
mainly to Rights and Democracy and Inter Pares which have a larger funding base than
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either En Camino or CSN, it  is not beyond En Camino or CSN’s scope to participate in 
direct funding activities. For instance, specific fund-raising campaigns run by these 
NGOs could yield positive results with the proceeds going to a specific organisation or 
community in Colombia. In order to be the most meaningful, projects funded by 
northern NGOs must be designed and implemented by local people or these projects 
run the risk of being co-opted by foreign interests. The danger is that indigenous 
communities and organisations begin to tailor their projects to match the interests of 
NGOs abroad, in order to secure funding. While I realize the funding role is altruistic,
I also believe that redistribution of wealth, from an area as rich as North America to a 
country that was rated 73rd in the world on the United Nations Development 
Programme Human Development Index in 2004, is a worthwhile endeavor for an NGO.
Earlier, three opportunities for further research on this topic were identified: 
a more comprehensive study that examines the relationships between the many 
indigenous organisations that make up the indigenous movement in Colombia and 
NGOs working there, the effectiveness of Northern NGOs that are heavily engaged in 
networking activities in the South, and an investigation of the human rights 
accompaniment role played by some NGOs. Other possibilities for further research 
include comparing the work of local, Colombian NGOs and international NGOs within 
the realm of the indigenous movement, or performing a study similar to this thesis but 
in a different country. By then comparing and contrasting the effectiveness of various 
North American NGO roles based on different national contexts, it  may be possible to 
indicate whether these roles seem to be universally and widely applicable or highly 
dependent on national situations.
Finally, further exploration of the potential for international solidarity as a 
means to improve the situation of indigenous communities in Colombia is a last
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opportunity for further research that I wish to mention. Brecher et al. cite many 
examples of where solidarity among individuals and organizations has converged 
around specific issues in order to reverse or alter injustices. These examples include 
the international responses to the Bolivian government's sale of the public water 
system in the country and the high prices of AIDS drugs in Africa set by the 
pharmaceutical company Pfizer, as well as the multi-country strike of 
Bridgestone/Firestone workers as a result of wage cuts in U.S. factories (Brecher et al. 
2000:27-8). A study examining the international collaboration of NGOs around the 
Colombian conflict would be well worthwhile. Any of these studies would help to 
bring about a more complete picture of the relationship between NGOs and social 
movements.
The most important contribution this thesis makes is to challenge the 
usefulness of NGO projects. In the short-term, NGOs seek to reach specific goals 
within a specific amount of time, within the constraints of a fixed budget and stated 
project goals. If the NGO manages to accomplish this, the work is exalted and often 
used as a basis with which to secure further funding and begin new projects. I have 
argued that within the realm of social movements, specifically the Colombian 
indigenous movement, NGOs must refocus this very short-sighted lens in order to 
become more intimately and lastingly involved in the communities and organisations 
with whom they work. Because of the nature of social movements, NGOs cannot be 
effective in working with social movements if  they are focused on the short term. 
Fostering meaningful, long-term relationships based on trust and reciprocity should be 
the basis for any NGO-social movement collaboration.
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Appendix
Questions asked of NGO Representatives:
1 ) Which indigenous groups do you work with in Colombia? Would you say these groups 
are part of the indigenous movement?
2) How long has your NGO been working with the group(s)? How long do you intend to 
work with this/these group(s)?
134
3) How would you characterize your NGO’s role with the group(s)? Is it one of 
advocacy? research? welfare? capacity-building? other? a combination?
4) What are your NGO’s goals in working with that/those group(s)? How is your NGO 
going about achieving those goals?
5) What are the goals of the indigenous movement? How do your NGOs’ goals and that 
of the movement intersect?
6) Do you feel your NGO is effective in this context? What are some successes you 
have had? Failures?
7) What are some of the major challenges your NGO is facing/has faced in working 
with the Colombian indigenous movement? How have you worked to overcome the 
challenges?
8) Do you see any way to improve your NGO’s effectiveness in working with the 
indigenous movement?
9) Do you feel that it is important for northern NGOs to support the indigenous 
movement? Why or why not?
Questions asked of Betsy Marsh, an expert involved with the movement in a non-NGO 
capacity:
1) What group(s) have you worked with within the indigenous movement in Colombia? 
What did you do?
2) What are the long-term and short-term goals of the groups you worked with, and 
the indigenous movement broadly? How are these goals being achieved?
3) What challenges does the movement face and how are they being overcome?
4) Do you believe that northern NGOs have a role to play in aiding Colombia’s 
indigenous movement to achieve their goals? If so, what roles?
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